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Abstract
Increased interactions among peoples and states combined with the growth of
written constitutions are creating new opportunities for “extra-territorial” forms
of constitutional interpretation, that is, the interpretation of domestic constitutions
by “outsiders.” This article considers the potential beneﬁts, and dangers, of out-
sider interpretation. It also identiﬁes factors relevant to the appropriateness or
legitimacy of such practices, drawing from analogous rules and doctrines devel-
oped in the context of U.S. federalism and international law. 
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CONSTITUTIONS INSIDE OUT: OUTSIDER INTERVENTIONS IN DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTESTS 
Rosalind Dixon* & Vicki C. Jackson** 
 
Increased interactions among peoples and states combined with the growth of written 
constitutions are creating new opportunities for “extra-territorial” forms of constitutional 
interpretation, that is, the interpretation of domestic constitutions by “outsiders.” This article 
considers the potential benefits, and dangers, of outsider interpretation. It also identifies factors 
relevant to the appropriateness or legitimacy of such practices, drawing from analogous rules 
and doctrines developed in the context of U.S. federalism and international law.  
 
Debates over the effects of globalization on constitutional law have thus far tended to 
focus on questions of the permissibility of domestic courts considering foreign or international 
law in domestic interpretation, or on the domestic effects of international or supranational norms 
that are arguably inconsistent with domestic constitutional law;
1 such debates have also 
considered when national constitutional norms apply extra-territorially to citizens or state actors 
engaging in conduct outside a nation’s borders.
2  But globalization also provides opportunities 
for “outsider” or “extraterritorial” actors to interpret other nations’ domestic constitutions.    
People are increasingly moving across borders in ways that mean that even relatively 
low-level executive officials are required to engage in acts of extra-territorial constitutional 
                                                       
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, Senior Visiting Fellow, UNSW Faculty of Law. 
**Thurgood Marshall Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  Our thanks to Daniel Abebe, Bill Alford, Douglas 
Baird, Allan Erbsen, Yochai Benkler, Carlos Bernal-Pulido, Gabi Blum, Daniela Caruso, Jim Cavallaro, Kristin 
Collins, Alison Duxbury, Dick Fallon, Jim Fleming, David Fontana, Tom Ginsburg, John Goldberg, Leslie Griffin, 
Lonny Hoffman, Keith Hylton, Linda McClain, Jordan Paust, Chibli Mallat, Martha Minow, Gerald Neuman, 
Cheryl Saunders, Michael Seidman, Greg Shaffer, Joe Singer, Adrienne Stone, Lior Strahilevitz, David Strauss, 
Larry Tribe, Carlos Vazquez, David Wilkins,  and to all of the participants in workshops at the University of 
Minnesota Law School,  Macquarie University Centre for Legal Governance, Melbourne Law School, Harvard Law 
School, Boston University Law School and the University of Houston Law Center, for helpful discussion and/or 
comments. We benefited from and appreciate the excellent research assistance provided by Katherine Arnold, 
Elizabeth Grosso,  Jason Lee and Alice Pailthorpe. 
1 See e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Foreword – Comment: Constitutional Comparisons, Convergence, Resistance, 
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 111 (2005) [hereinafter, “Comment”]; Agora: The United States Constitution 
and International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 42 (2004). 
2 See e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732-33 (2008); R. v Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, para. 24 (Can.); Al-
Skeini, [2007] UKHL 26, para. 1-2 (UK).  In Germany, the constitution has been interpreted to impose on the 
government an affirmative duty to protect fetal life, which may have influenced some within the German system to 
construe statutes prohibiting illegal abortions to have extraterritorial force with respect to German citizens. See 
Debates, 1991 O.J. (Annex 3-403) 204 (Mar. 14, 1991) (Statement of Rep. Keppelhoff-Wiechert) (defending 
gynecological examinations by German officials at the Dutch-German border on female German citizens suspected 
of having abortions while traveling abroad on the grounds that officials “are required by the code of criminal 
procedure to investigate illegal abortions of this kind carried out abroad where there are grounds for suspecting that 
such has been committed”). 
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interpretation, at least by way of a certain presumption of constitutional validity.   Academics 
and judges are progressively turning their outlook “outward”, in many countries, so as to join in 
an increasingly global “dialogue” over constitutional questions.
3 States are becoming more and 
more inter-connected, in their economies, stability and security, in ways that mean that foreign 
governments are taking an ever stronger interest in the constitutional and legal arrangements of 
their neighbors, and allies.  And just as some national constitutions have incorporated aspects of 
international law as being at a constitutional level domestically,
4 so international organizations  
(like the OAS) have begun to incorporate into international regimes an obligation to comply with 
domestic constitutional law.   
All of these changes create new and increased openings for foreign actors – of both a 
state and non-state kind – to form, and express, opinions about the meaning of other countries’ 
constitutions, or even to take coercive action based on those views. A variety of foreign actors – 
especially executive officials, but including courts, members of legislatures, and international 
organizations, governmental or nongovernmental – are taking up this opportunity, contributing to 
discourses of constitutional interpretation that cross national lines and may occur entirely 
“outside the courts”.
5  These constitutional interventions cross both national and institutional 
boundaries: they are emphatically not limited to exchanges among judges. 
Our purpose in this paper is primarily a positive one:  to identify and provide an 
analytical framework for what we believe is an increasing phenomenon of such public acts of 
outsider interpretation. After describing various situations in which this occurs,  we go on to 
identify potential normative advantages of outsider interpretation, and situations in which those 
advantages are most likely to be present. We then identify potential normative risks of outsider 
interpretation, and, again, where those risks are likely to be at their highest. Finally, we offer 
some very tentative thoughts on factors that may help evaluate the risks and benefits in particular 
contexts and that more generally bear on the appropriateness or legitimacy of outsider 
interpretation. To the extent the paper has a normative aim, it is only to suggest the need for 
critical reflection, and self-awareness, on the part of outsiders, about potential benefits and risks 
of acts of outsider constitutional interpretation. 
Constitutional interpretation by outsiders, we suggest, has at least three potential benefits:  
first, the ability to deepen and enrich processes of constitutional deliberation by insiders; second, 
the ability to inform insiders about how different constitutional interpretive choices will affect or 
be viewed by external audiences, and thus affect potentially important relationships with 
outsiders; and third, the prospect of offering a more impartial perspective than any insider is able 
to offer, in sensitive constitutional controversies. 
Such outsider acts of interpretation, however, also carry clear potential downside risks.  
First, compared to insiders, outsiders will often be far less informed about domestic 
constitutional practices and sources, or about the likely consequences of particular constitutional 
                                                       
3 See e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT. L. J. 191, 192 (2003). 
4 See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 9; CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) 
Art. 75(22).  
5 Compare Mark Tushnet, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).  
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choices; they may thus see similarities between their own constitutional systems or approaches 
and those of a foreign jurisdiction, when in fact no real similarity exists.   Secondly, and related, 
outsiders may be perceived as illegitimately ‘meddling’ in domestic constitutional debates -- out 
of ignorance, self-interest, or misplaced constitutional evangelism – in ways that undermine the 
position they (and perhaps others on the ground) seek to advance.  Third, outsider interpretations 
may also lack relevance or legitimacy, due to a lack of “fit” with existing interpretive norms, 
such as coherence, or with commitments to “democratic” control of constitutional meaning at the 
domestic level.  The way in which these potential benefits and risks should be evaluated 
together, we argue, will depend on particular cases and contexts, in which additional 
considerations of legitimacy or appropriateness may exist.   
In the contexts in which outsider interpretation may occur,  it will be helpful to consider 
several other questions, including these: who (i.e. what kind of actor) is engaging in the act of 
outsider interpretation; by what means are outsiders engaging in extraterritorial interpretation and 
in particular, are they engaged in coercive attempts to influence or not; how outsiders are 
approaching the interpretive exercise (e.g. with how much attention to, or deference to, local 
expertise and debate, and how much reliable information); when they are engaging in such acts 
(e.g. before or after opportunities for local interpretation); and why they are doing so – that is,  
with what, if any, justification or reason (such as consent, or internal constitutional necessity).  
Who is engaging in a particular act of outsider interpretation, for example, is likely to 
bear on both the competence and impartiality of such interpretation, as well as on the degree to 
which it may have coercive force; all of these factors may bear as well on the potential for such 
interpretation being viewed as legitimate, or generating nationalistic backlash.  Thus, we suggest, 
academics and NGO’s will often be best placed to engage in those forms of outsider 
interpretation that are regarded by those in the country in question as appropriate or useful,  
while executive officials may be least well placed to do so.  Foreign or transnational courts, in 
turn, will tend to occupy a more intermediate position, which suggests the need for careful 
attention by judges to the specific constitutional context when deciding whether to engage in 
such acts of interpretation. 
By what means outsider interpretations are offered is likewise significant.  Scholars 
writing for their own purposes and publishing in ordinary scholarly fora are far less likely to be 
seen as attempting to coerce others; their work, even if normatively focused on arguing for a 
change, will more likely be viewed as non-coercive efforts to persuade.  Executive officials who 
“raise concerns” about whether action is constitutional within another domestic order may be 
understood, implicitly, to present a potential for coercion; and interpretations of constitutionality 
that are directly linked to sanctions, whether economic, political or military, will be understood 
as coercive (albeit of different forms and degrees, depending more precisely on the means used). 
How, when, and why particular actors engage in the interpretive task will also have a 
clear potential to affect the strength of concerns about outsider competence and democratic 
legitimacy. The more that outsiders, for example, engage with existing local positions on 
constitutional interpretation, the more informed and thus legitimate, from the point of view of 
competency, their acts of  interpretation are likely to be; the more access they have to reliable 
information about on-the-ground conditions, practices and legal sources within a country, the 
more accurate and useful their acts of interpretation are likely to be. 
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  Timing can thus also be an important factor to consider in the context of any act of extra-
territorial interpretation, given the link between delay (by outsiders) and the opportunity for a 
local dialogue over constitutional meaning to develop.  Yet “timing” may matter in non-linear 
ways to the analysis: the occasions that prompt outsider interpretation may involve perceived 
emergencies, in which, if outside interpretive action is to be effective, it must be taken quickly.   
The “when” question is closely related to the “why” question, of what motivates or 
justifies particular outside interpretive interventions, a question whose salience increases with the 
coercive force of the intervention.  Drawing on jurisprudences that have developed in the United 
States federal system, in European law, and in international law, we will suggest that there are a 
number of emerging public law norms for dealing with situations of interpretive pluralism, that 
is, where more than one level or type of interpretive decision-maker might have jurisdiction, or 
interests, in speaking to a particular point, that might come into play in analyzing the questions 
of  “when” and “why” outsider interpretation may be appropriate.  These include, first,  the 
significance of consent, which is central to the idea of sovereignty in international law and can 
be found across federalism doctrines in the United States. Second, externalities –  how one 
state’s law affects the legitimate interests of others – can matter in assessing jurisdictional 
competence, whether within a federation or as between national and supranational levels of 
governance, and thus may bear on interpretive competence or stake as well. Third,  the adequacy 
of the local forum – including the allowability and depth of internal debate over the 
constitutional question within the domestic polity as a whole – may bear on the appropriateness 
of outsider interventions on constitutional contests;  analogous concepts  can be found in U.S. 
judicial federalism doctrines as well as in the requirement of “complementarity” in international 
criminal law. Fourth, departures from a norm of legal regularity may be seen to invite outsider 
intervention; the idea of legal regularity includes both a norm of “good faith”, and a somewhat 
non-positivist idea that “law” has some content apart from what its authorized decision-makers 
declare, reflected, for example, in the “inadequate state ground” doctrine in U.S. federal courts 
law, which treats “novel and bizarre” interpretations of state law as not precluding federal 
intervention.  Finally, whether decision-makers face a domestic legal necessity, or duty, to 
decide on some issue of foreign law, in the course of resolving their own domestic legal 
questions, or are acting from reasons other than legal necessity, may bear on the perceived 
appropriateness of their interpretive intervention.  
The article is divided into six parts.  Following this introduction, Part II defines the scope 
of outsider forms of constitutional interpretation considered here, and provides recent examples 
of different forms of such interpretation.   Part III sets out several potential benefits of such 
outsider interpretation, in terms of deliberative and relational information and impartiality, while 
Part IV explores the potential dangers, or pitfalls, of outsider interpretation from perspectives of 
internal competence, jurisprudential commitments and democratic or popular legitimacy.  Part V 
then explores how these different advantages and dangers might be evaluated in particular 
contexts; using case-studies from Afghanistan, Fiji, Honduras, Nicaragua, Pakistan and 
Zimbabwe, we draw on potential analogies in domestic constitutional law and international law 
for addressing problems of interpretive pluralism.  Part VI then offers a brief conclusion.  
II.   What is “Outsider” or “Extraterritorial” Constitutional Interpretation?  
As our introduction suggests, the range of activity encompassed within the idea of 
outsider (or extraterritorial) constitutional interpretation is vast, including interpretive claims 
http://law.bepress.com/unswwps-flrps12/53 
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about foreign constitutions that are made in scholarly discussion and analysis as well as judicial 
pronouncements, statements by NGOs, and statements and actions by diplomats and officials of 
different countries, and by international organizations.
6   
As we shall see, the territorial component of where the interpretation occurs is not in fact 
what is significant; what is significant is whether the interpreter is understood as an “insider” or 
an “outsider” to the system of whose laws she offers an interpretation.   But to the extent that 
territoriality remains a signal identifier of states and of nationality, “extraterritoriality” is a useful 
way of capturing the (technically more accurate) idea of “outsider” interpretation.  We use both 
terms herein.  
Scholars around the world are increasingly interested in comparative law and analysis.  
The purposes of such analyses may be positive, that is, an attempt to understand and accurately 
describe, categorize and analyze legal systems and approaches in comparative perspective.  The 
work may be normative, in at least three senses: it may seek to critique or reform the laws of the 
scholar’s home country by resort to comparison; it may seek to encourage change or to praise 
existing interpretations in another country or system; and/or it may be seeking to identify a 
universal approach that the scholar advances for all countries or systems to follow.  Each of these 
may entail extraterritorial interpretation, in the sense that an actor who is not situated within a 
particular national community engages in interpretation of that country’s laws or systems.  When 
the scholarly work is normative in the second and third senses – that is, as part of an effort to 
affect interpretation in another country, or in all the countries of the world – it raises most 
acutely some of the normative questions identified in the introduction. 
There is, to be sure, something uneasy about describing scholars as within or outside 
particular national communities.  It might be thought that a goal of scholarship is to transcend the 
limits of understanding imposed by any particular national education, to broaden the perspective 
to achieve a distance from, or stand apart from, a particular system or (alternatively) to stand 
within multiple systems. And yet, recognizing the pull of particular national affiliations or 
upbringings is also, arguably, an important step towards improved scholarship. Although there 
are some true “cosmopolitans,” raised and brought up in multiple countries, who feel little or no 
sense of affiliation with any of their growing up countries, this is a rarity.  Most scholars are 
influenced, in the frameworks in which they organize the world, by both the systems in which 
they grow up and the country and cultural context in which they live, and are thus, to that extent, 
outsiders to systems that they may learn about – from a distance – later on. Recognition of this 
situatedness may be an important first step towards improved scholarship. 
7 
                                                       
6  We are limiting our discussion to interpretive claims that are made publicly and openly; similar considerations 
may apply to interpretive claims made “in private,” but we do not analyze these here. Nor do we consider the related 
but quite distinctive questions that surround outsider involvement in the actual drafting of new constitutions. On the 
increasing role of “outsiders” and the international community in domestic constitution-drafting, see, e.g. 
FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: Case Studies in Constitution Making (Laurel E. Miller, 
with  Louis Aucoin eds.  2010); Zaid Ali-Ali, “Constitutional Drafting and External Influence” in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., Edward Elgar Publishing 2011).   
7 For helpful discussion, see Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Rethinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. 
Int’l L. J.  411 (1985) (discussing techniques of “distancing” and “differencing” to help comparatavists overcome 
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International NGOs that purport to be global might be seen as comprising a mix of 
insider and outsider participants. Yet in their claim to universality in stance, they proceed from 
premises not bounded by the internal concerns of particular states, and their efforts to influence 
domestic constitutional interpretation may share some of the characteristics of outsider scholar 
comment.  
Judges, too, are also increasingly being called on to consider the constitutional practices 
of other countries or systems, especially in the area of human rights (protected both by 
international law and by domestic constitutional law).   In some contexts, such as within the 
Commonwealth, outsider interpretation by courts has been a longstanding tradition, by virtue of 
the role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (PC) in constitutional appeals from 
former British colonies.
8  Not only has the Privy Council reviewed constitutional decisions of 
national courts, but national courts within the Commonwealth have long had a practice of 
referring to and evaluating decisions concerning the constitutions of other countries within the 
Commonwealth. But beyond these, there has been significant growth in the practice of outsider 
constitutional interpretation by national courts in more diffuse, horizontal settings.  
Two recent instances of such outsider interpretation in relation to U.S. constitutional 
norms are the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in R v. Keegstra
9 evaluating 
arguments drawn from U.S. first amendment law in examining the constitutionality of a law 
prohibiting hate speech, and the Constitutional Court of South Africa in National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister for Justice (National Coalition I)
10 giving implicit 
consideration to the ongoing force of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers v. 
Hardwick
11 in determining the constitutionality of South Africa’s ban on same-sex intercourse. 
The majority of the SCC in Keegstra argued that U.S. law was unclear, and that there 
were arguments from within U.S. constitutional law to recognize the speech-enhancing effects of 
allowing bans on certain forms of hateful speech, thus, thereby, implicitly, suggesting that this 
might be the better approach to take.  But any such suggestion was implicit, at best; the majority 
                                                                                                                                                                               
the limitations and biases of their perspectives, which are based on the legal systems with which they are most 
familiar).  For discussion of the distinct questions that may be presented by the kind of academic writing (or joining 
in writings) that is designed to influence coercive decisions by government actors (especially courts), see Richard H. 
Fallon Jr., Scholars’ Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Professor (NYU Working Paper, 2011). 
 
8  The degree of coercive outsider interpretation by judges within the Commonwealth may diminish, due to recent 
changes in the jurisdiction of the Privy Council. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.  The European courts 
subject national constitutional provisions to scrutiny under their supranational regimes, although have not thus far 
engaged in serious interpretive moves concerning the content of those national constitutions. See, e.g., Sejdić and 
Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. Nos. 27996/06 & 34836/06 paras. 50, 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Dec. 22, 2009) 
(finding various aspects of the Bosnian Constitution, which restrict election to the House of Peoples and Presidency 
to the three major ethnic groups involved in the civil war (i.e. Croat, Serb or Bosnian Muslim), in breach of the 
European Convention of Human Rights and its Additional Protocols). 
 
9 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
10 (CCT 11/98) [1998] ZACC 15; 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 53 (S. Afr.). 
11 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
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did not reach a conclusion on U.S. constitutional law, writing only that even if U.S. law would 
prohibit such statutes, Canadian constitutional law – which was the law at issue – was different, 
in its formulation of the rights and in its commitment to multiculturalism.  The purpose of 
identifying multiple strands of U.S. constitutional law on this issue was not so much to persuade 
U.S. jurists to change, but to destabilize contrary U.S. law as a persuasive source in Canadian 
discourse.  
The South African Constitutional Court, in finding an apartheid-era ban on sodomy 
unconstitutional in National Coalition I, held that “nothing in jurisprudence of other open and 
democratic societies based on human dignity, equality and freedom… would lead . . . to a 
different conclusion”.
12  In fact, on balance, they held that foreign constitutional developments 
provided “support [for] such a conclusion” because “in many of these countries there ha[d] been 
a definite trend towards decriminalization” of sodomy.
13  The Court, in reaching this view, also 
sought not only to distinguish Bowers v. Hardwick,
14 but also implicitly sought to raise questions 
about the degree to which Bowers remained controlling authority, under the Due Process or 
Equal Protection Clauses, given that it had “been the subject of sustained criticism” and was in 
apparent tension with Romer v. Evans.
15 
Opportunities for more direct forms of constitutional interpretation by courts may also 
arise in the context of extradition processes, decisions by the executive to remove people to third 
countries, challenges to foreign expropriations, and cases involving the enforcements of 
judgments or processes from one judicial system in the courts of another country.
16 Thus, in 
Soering v. United Kingdom,
17 the judges of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) wrote 
at some length about the quality of Virginia’s system, under the controlling authority of U.S. 
constitutional law, for administering and carrying out the death penalty.  The issue before the 
Court was not what was or was not constitutional in the United States, but rather was whether the 
possibility for the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in the United States under 
current law would pose a risk, for a young man proposed to be extradited to the United States, of 
violating Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and 
                                                       
12 National Coalition I, 1999 (1) SA at 39-40, para. 39 (Ackermann. J) 
13Id. at paras 39-40. 
14 Id at paras. 53, 55 (noting that U.S. Constitution, unlike the South African, does not include specific protections of 
privacy and dignity nor an express ban on discrimination based on sexual orientation and that U.S. constitutional 
jurisprudence imposes different requirements on courts in identifying unenumerated rights than does South Africa). 
15 Id. at para. 54. Consistent with general notions of comity, the Court suggested that it was not in fact 
“consider[ing] …the present standing of Bowers is in the United States,” see id at para 55, but clearly it did so, albeit 
implicitly. 
16 Cf., e.g., UEJF et LICRA v Yahoo Inc et Yahoo France, Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of 
original jurisdiction] Paris, May 22, 2000, Interim Order No. 00/05308, available at 
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm (Fr.) (noting, but rejecting, the argument by Yahoo that 
the French court was incompetent to hear the case because any subsequent attempt to enforce the judgment against 
Yahoo in the United States would contravene the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). 
17 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 439, 469-472 paras. 92-99 (1989). 
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“inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.  In holding that it would, the ECtHR did not 
express any view on the constitutionality under U.S. law of the practices it described; and the 
decision does not appear to have had the normative purpose of affecting U.S. law.  However, the 
decision might also be taken as an implicit critique of U.S. constitutional law, from without, to 
the extent that it permits practices that would be understood to violate Article 3.  
Another example involves the recent decision of the High Court of Australia (HCA) to 
invalidate the Australian government’s policy of transferring asylum seekers to Malaysia under 
its so-called “Malaysia solution”.  Although members of the HCA in this case expressly avoided 
expressing “any concluded view on matters of Malaysian law or administrative practice”, they 
had been explicitly urged to consider provisions of the Malaysian constitution protecting various 
“fundamental liberties”, as part of determining whether the Australian Minister of Immigration 
had power to declare Malaysia a proper place for the receipt of asylum-seekers under the 
Australian Migration Act.
18 For Malaysia, which clearly wished to pursue this arrangement with 
Australia, the HCA’s findings on such an issue could also have affected its own domestic 
institutions’ approach to the interpretation of those norms.  
Executive officials, like judges, are also increasingly engaging in foreign policy practices 
that involve their deciding on the meaning of foreign constitutions.  We briefly describe six 
incidents of executive extraterritorial interpretation below.  
Honduras:  In June 2009, the elected President of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, was 
arrested by military authorities, and removed from the country; Roberto Michelleti, a member of 
the elected legislature, holding the office designated as next in the line of succession, was 
installed as President.  Organs of the international community, and spokespersons for many 
states, including the United States, expressed deep concern and disapproval, characterizing this 
event as a coup d’état, and, importantly, a departure from the constitutional order of Honduras.
19    
International and foreign diplomats were involved in various efforts to negotiate a resolution of 
the crisis in Honduras, and some OAS member states indicated that they would refuse to 
recognize the outcome of elections held in late 2009 unless President Zelaya were restored to 
office before the election.
20  Honduras was also accused of an “unconstitutional alteration of the 
democratic order” by the OAS, and of having sustained a “coup” that was “outside the bounds of 
[its] constitution” by the United States.
21    
                                                       
18 Plaintiff M70/2011 v. Minister for Immigration, [2011] HCA 32, pars 28, 33.  
19 Ginger Thompson & Marc Lacey, O.A.S. Votes to Suspend Honduras Over Coup, THE N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2009, 
at A5; Background Briefing on the Situation in Honduras, U.S. Dept of State, July 1, 2009 (noting the significance 
of action by the OAS under Articles 20 and 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which refers to the 
“interruption of constitutional and democratic order”). 
20 Nations divided on recognizing Honduran president-elect, CNN, Nov. 30, 2009, http://articles.cnn.com/2009-11-
30/world/honduras.elections_1_president-roberto-micheletti-zelaya-supporters-zelaya-and-
micheletti?_s=PM:WORLD (noting that the U.S., Columbia, and Costa Rica had stated they would recognize the 
results of the election while Argentina, Brazil, and Spain said that they would not recognize the results).  
21 Helene Cooper & Marc Lacey, In a Coup in Honduras, Ghosts of Past U.S. Policies, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, 
at A1 (quoting senior U.S. official as saying that the U.S. told Honduras that “you can't do anything outside the 
bounds of your constitution”);  Marc Lacey & Ginger Thompson, Compromise Is Sought to Honduras Standoff, 
http://law.bepress.com/unswwps-flrps12/53 
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Pakistan: In March 2007, in Pakistan, President Musharraf ordered the suspension of 
Chief Justice Chaudhry from the Supreme Court of Pakistan on the grounds of alleged 
misconduct.
22  The Chief Justice, however, challenged his suspension before the Supreme Court 
itself, and in July 2007, a majority of the Court (by a 10-3 vote) issued a decision finding his 
removal unlawful, and ordering his reinstatement.
23  In November 2007, Musharraf then declared 
a state of emergency, issuing a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO),
24 which mandated that 
judges take a new oath of office and refrain from acting against the PCO, and suspended a 
number of constitutionally guaranteed rights.
25 Seven members of the Supreme Court (along 
with 56 high court judges) refused to take this new oath of office, and were accordingly 
dismissed, so that Musharraf was able to appoint seven replacement justices to the Court.
26    The 
response of various countries, and the Commonwealth in particular, was to call for repeal of the 
emergency provisions and “full restoration of the Constitution and the independence of the 
judiciary”, and to suspend Pakistan from membership in the Commonwealth, pending such 
action.
27   The U.S, by contrast, expressed no view on the actual meaning, or interpretation, of 
the constitution, suggesting instead it was a matter for Pakistan rather than the U.S. “to 
address.”
28 
Afghanistan: A major disagreement emerged, in 2009, in Afghanistan between President 
Karzai and his supporters, and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), over the timing of 
democratic elections under the 2004 Afghan Constitution.  Karzai argued for early elections (in 
April 2009), on the basis that Art 61 of the Constitution required presidential elections to be 
                                                                                                                                                                               
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2009, at A5 (quoting the OAS as calling the events in Honduras an "unconstitutional alteration 
of the democratic order”), See also White House Press Office, Remarks by President Obama and President Uribe of 
Colombia, June 29, 2008 (referring to the coup in Honduras and stating that the “coup was not legal and that 
President Zelaya remains the President of Honduras”);  Editorial, A Way Out in Honduras, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 
2009, at A18 (reporting that Obama has put a pause on U.S. aid and called the actions illegal, with the U.N. and 
O.A.S. agreeing that the actions were illegal).  
22 Salman Masood, Suspension of Jurist Unleashes Furor Against Musharaff, N.Y. TIMES, March 15, 2007; Library 
of Congress Report, SUSPENSION AND REINSTATEMENT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF PAKISTAN: FROM JUDICIAL CRISIS 
TO RESTORING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE?  
23Mubashir Zaidi and Laura King, Pakistani Court Reinstates Top Judge, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2007. 
24 Proclamation of Emergency, Nov 3, 2007, available at 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_03nov07/proclamation_emergency_20071103.html 
25 CRS Report for Congress, Pakistan’s Political Crises (January 3, 2008) 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34240.pdf 1-2 
26Id.  
27 Neville De Silva, “Pakistan Faces Second Suspension from Commonwealth in Eight Years”, Asian Tribune, 
November 14, 2007. http://www.asiantribune.com/node/8246.   In making such calls, the Commonwealth in 
particular was clearly motivated by a desire to maintain its own principles and values, but also placed explicit 
emphasis on deviations from Pakistan’s internal constitutional norms as part of this process. 
28 See White House Press Briefing, March 4, 2008, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080304-4.html 
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called 30-60 days before the expiration of the current president’s term (which was deemed to 
occur on the first of Jawza on the fifth year after the last election)
29, whereas the IEC favored 
delaying elections, based on considerations such as weather, logistics and security and the 
obligation, under Art 33 of the Constitution, to ensure universal access to voting.
30  The 
international community, in turn, made a number of public statements in support of the IEC 
position:  the U.S. in particular argued forcefully for an August election deadline, in order to 
allow enough time for electoral campaigning and adequate security.
31 
Fiji: In 2006 in Fiji, General Bainimarama, the leader of the Fijian military, led a coup 
designed, he claimed, to overthrow the then (interim) government, and to restore a democratic, 
non-racial non-ethnic government.
32  Bainimarama and his supporters also justified the coup as 
constitutional, according to an implied doctrine of necessity.
33  The international community, 
however, condemned the coup as illegal, and many countries suspended aid and trade with Fiji.
34  
Various countries in their submissions to the United Nations Human Rights Council, in its 
subsequent periodic report on Fiji, also explicitly labeled the coup as unconstitutional, seeking, 
for example, the “reestablish[ment] [of] a constitutional order complying with the rule of law.”
35 
Zimbabwe: In 2010, in Zimbabwe, serious tensions arose between President Mugabe 
and Prime Minister Tzvangirai over Mugabe’s adherence to the terms of their power-sharing 
                                                       
29 Jerome Starkey, Challenge to Karzai’s Right to Rule after Poll Date is Delayed, INDEPENDENT (UK), Jan 30, 
2009. 
30 KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21922, AFGHANISTAN: POLITICS, ELECTIONS, AND 
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, 14-15 (2009); Jon Boone, Hamid Karzai accused of Brinksmanship over Call for 
Early Afghanistan Election, THE GUARDIAN, March 1, 2009. 
31 Gordon Duguid, Press Statement, Decision by Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, U.S. Dept. of 
State (March 4, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/03/119977.htm.  
32 Josaia Vorque Bainimarama, Statement to the U.N. Gen. Assembly (Sept. 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/62/2007/pdfs/fiji-en.pdf.  
33 Josaia Vorque Bainimarama, Press Statement Announcing the Military Takeover of the Government (Dec. 5, 
2006), available at http://www.fijitimes.com/extras/TakeOverAddress.pdf.  
34 For example Australia imposed sanctions including travel restrictions against members of the government and 
military, an arms embargo, suspension of defense cooperation, and suspension of Ministerial level contact. 
Australian Government, Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s Autonomous Sanctions: Fiji, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/un/unsc_sanctions/Fiji.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). New Zealand restricted 
communication with the governing regime and military, instituted travel bans, and limited sporting contacts. New 
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Frequently Asked Questions about New Zealand’s Policy Towards 
Fiji, http://mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Pacific/0-Fiji-FAQ.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). The United States 
suspended military aid to Fiji and refused to issue travel visas to members of the regime or military. U.S. Dept. of 
State, U.S. Embassy in Suva, U.S. Policy Towards Fiji: Section 7008, http://suva.usembassy.gov/section_7008.html 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2011). 
35 See Human Rights Council, Report of theWorking Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Fiji, I.B.5, U.N. Doc. 
A/HCR/14/8 (March 23, 2010), Section II para. 20 (Slovakia), 35 (Switzerland); Human Rights Council, Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review. Compilation Prepared By the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, In Accordance with Paragraph 15(B) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1U.N. Doc. 
A/HCR/WG.6/7/FJI/2 (Nov. 13, 2009)2-3 
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agreement (GPA), and the amendment to the Zimbabwean constitution (amendment 19) designed 
to give effect to that agreement.
36  Mugabe, for instance, took the position that he was not 
required to adhere to the agreement while Zimbabwe remained under Western sanctions,
37 while 
Tzvangirai claimed that Mugabe was breaching the agreement in a number of respects, including 
by appointing ambassadors, judges and governors without consultation with the opposition.
38  
Outsiders, such as the EU, U.S. and South Africa, also took a number of different positions on 
these issues, with South Africa
39 and the EU
40 supporting the constitutionality of Mugabe’s 
actions in making these appointments, and the U.S. refusing to lift sanctions until Mugabe 
complied with the GPA.
41 
Nicaragua: In 2009 in Nicaragua, in preparation for presidential elections in 2011, 
President Daniel Ortega, a long-time leader of the Sandinista movement, brought a constitutional 
challenge to various provisions of the Nicaraguan constitution limiting a president’s term in 
office to two, non-consecutive terms.
42  An earlier proposal by Ortega to amend the constitution, 
to repeal such limits, had been defeated in the national legislative assembly, but Ortega argued 
that the relevant limits were in any event ineffective as themselves adopted unconstitutionally.
43  
The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court (CSJ) also ultimately accepted this argument, 
though the panel that delivered the judgment was composed entirely of Sandinista-appointed 
judges, and the decision was held by the panel to apply only to the petitioners (i.e. Ortega 
                                                       
36 South Africa to Engage Mugavi & Tsvangiri Over Latest Spat, THE ZIMBABWEAN, Oct. 13, 2010; Paidamoyo 
Muzulu, Zim Can Revert to Old Constitution if GPA Fails, THE INDEPENDENT (ZIMBABWE), Feb. 18, 2011 
(Describing the relationship between the 19
th Amendment and the GPA). 
37 JON LUNN AND GAVIN THOMPSON, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, ZIMBABWE SINCE THE GLOBAL POLITICAL 
AGREEMENT, SN/IA/5793, Dec. 3, 2010, at 5. 
38 South Africa to Engage Mugavi & Tsvangiri Over Latest Spat, THE ZIMBABWEAN, Oct. 13, 2010. 
39 Alex Bell, Zuma Welcome Ambassador Chosen by Mugabe, SW RADIO AFRICA NEWS, Feb. 4, 2011. 
40 EU Accepts Zim Ambassador, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 2010. However, the EU had expressed concern over 
the matter, saying that “[i]t is important that the ambassadors be fully empowered to speak on behalf of the whole 
government,” and that “[n]on-respect”for the GPA was “a matter of great concern.” EU to reject Mugabe’s 
ambassadors, EURACTIV (Oct 15, 2010), http://www.euractiv.com/foreign-affairs/eu-reject-mugabes-ambassadors-
news-498820. European Parliament members had also petitioned European Commission President Barroso and 
Council President Rompuy to refuse the credentials of Mugabe’s ambassador. EU Rejects Mugabe’s New 
Ambassadors, DAILY NEWS (ZIMBABWE), Oct. 20, 2010. 
41 Charles A. Ray, U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe, The Future of U.S.–Zimbabwe Relations, 6 (July 28, 2011), 
available at http://harare.usembassy.gov/uploads/gR/UX/gRUXzj8OPdQTpwO9-
A2uzw/20110728_RAY_SAPES_SPEECH.pdf. 
42 Tim Rogers, Despite Honduran crisis, Nicaraguan President Ortega launches bid to extend his term, Christian 
Science Monitor, July 20, 2009 at 6.  
43 Dante Figueroa, Nicaragua: Supreme Court Decision Permitting President, Others to Seek Reelection, Law 
Library of Congress, Dec. 19, 2009, available at 
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205401739_text; Jason Beaubien, Daniel Ortega Seeks 
Reelection in Nicaragua, NPR NEWS, Nov 5, 2011(Ortega unsuccessfully sought legislative agreement to amend the 
Constitution).  
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himself, and certain other Sandinista-mayoral candidates).
44  Various outsiders, by contrast, 
expressed clear doubts about the validity of this interpretation of the constitution.   The European 
Parliament, for example, passed a resolution expressly declaring its belief that the Nicaraguan 
Constitution was clear in “prohibit[ing] Presidents from serving for two successive terms in 
office”, and further, in providing that “only the legislature” and not the courts could “pronounce 
on constitutional reform,” and thus that President Ortega was “attempting illegally to 
circumvent” the relevant constitutional restrictions.
45  The U.S. government also expressed 
serious “concerns” about the decision of the Supreme Court, suggesting that it was part of a 
“larger pattern of questionable and irregular government actions”,
46  while the U.S. Ambassador 
to Nicaragua, Robert Callahan, went even further, arguing that while “Nicaragua can amend its 
Constitution…the Constitution itself says that amendments can only come from the Asamblea 
Legislativa [not the Corte Suprema de Justicia]”.
47 
 
We do not mean to suggest that these are the only examples of extraterritorial or outsider 
interpretation of constitutions by executive or diplomatic officials. As Professor Steven Schnably 
has shown, this may be an emerging trend in state relations, one in which assertions are made 
about the domestic constitutional bona fides of the actions of another state as a basis for 
diplomatic or other pressures on those holding power in the state to change their own 
interpretation.
48  But as he and others point out, such positions raise a number of questions, 
which we discuss below.  
 
III.   Benefits of Outsider Interpretation   
Benefits of outsider interpretation fall into at least three categories: First, they may offer a 
set of “deliberative” benefits, informational in character, about the historical derivation, or the 
                                                       
44 Figueroa, supra note 43 (noting that the court’s decision affected only the parties to the case); Beaubien, supra 
note note 43 (noting that the judges in the case were Sandinista-appointed). 
45 Resolution of 26 November 2009 on Nicaragua.   
46 Press Statement, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. State Department, Nicaraguan Supreme Court Ruling on Re-
elections (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/130875.htm.  
47 See Benjamin Witte-Lebhar, Opposition Infighting Has Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega Leading Ahead of 
November, Central American & Caribbean Affairs, March 24 2011.  
48 See Stephen J. Schnably, Emerging International Law Constraints on Constitutional Structure and Revision: A 
Preliminary Appraisal, 62 U. Miami L. Rev. 417, 460 (2008). Schnably discusses an episode involving Nicaragua, 
in which the U.S.. State Department reportedly accused the Nicaraguan Court of “ignor[ing] the constitutional 
principle of separation of powers” when it upheld action by the legislative assembly stripping members of the 
executive branch of immunity over campaign finance violations, action that arguably could be understood as an 
effort to increase the accountability of the executive. See Schnably, supra, at 473. He also describes how in Togo, 
international pressure was brought to bear to remedy “unconstitutional” action even after the constitution was 
amended to give formal sanction to a controversial presidential succession. Id. at 474-79.  For an earlier discussion 
of the challenges for the OAS in applying then-recent changes in its Charter relating to the suspension of member 
states in response to an overthrow of democratic government, see Stephen J. Schnably, Constitutionalism and 
Democratic Government in the Inter-American System, in Democratic Governance and International Law (Gregory 
H Fox and Brad Roth eds., 2000). 
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intended meaning of domestic norms (as where domestic norms are based on international 
human rights documents, or on a foreign constitution), or of the likely domestic consequences, 
based on experience elsewhere, of different interpretations of those norms.  Second, they may 
offer what one might call “relational” benefits, informing domestic interpreters –or others – of 
how interpretations will affect or be viewed by other states or important actors in the 
transnational communities of law in which states are now situated.  Finally, in some 
circumstances they may offer the prospect of less self-interested or more impartial accounts of 
certain kinds of domestic sources than those offered by interested parties within a state. 
A.   Deliberative Benefits of Outsider Interpretation  
  We have each elsewhere argued the benefits, for good deliberation, of domestic courts 
considering foreign constitutional law and experience.
49   And, as suggested above in the 
introduction, one could conceptualize this as a form of outsider or extraterritorial interpretation, 
since in order to consider and use foreign materials a prior act of interpretation –even if not 
experienced as such – must occur.  But in this paper, we are concerned with the possible benefits, 
to domestic interpretation, of foreign actors offering accounts of the contested domestic law –
especially where offered to influence or affect the other state in its own interpretation of its own 
law.   What benefits may accrue from such “outsider” interpretations? 
  First, foreign actors may have had experience interpreting provisions with similar terms 
and purposes; they may have useful experience about the range of doctrinal approaches and 
about the consequences of one as opposed to another interpretive account.  Amici filings or 
interventions before the European Court of Human Rights by U.S.-based “pro-choice” and “pro-
life” groups may provide examples.  In the “Written Observations” of a group of third party 
interveners, including a U.S. based pro-life group, arguments were made to the Grand Chamber 
of the Court about the implications of a holding against the validity of the Irish abortion law, and 
about the consistency of Irish abortion law with some international treaties (including the 
American Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on the Rights of the 
Child.)
50  Similarly, a U.S. based pro-choice group filed comments in another case involving 
Ireland’s abortion law before the European Court, arguing to the court the discriminatory 
consequences of restrictive abortion laws, and identifying global as well as European trends to 
more permissive regulations.
51  In detainee-rights cases before national constitutional courts, 
foreign scholars have argued that their own regimes illustrate that the consequences of allowing 
                                                       
49 See Rosalind Dixon, A Democratic Theory of Constitutional Comparison, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 947 (2008); VICKI 
C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (2010). 
50 See Joint Written Observations Of Third Party Interveners: · The European Centre for Law and Justice on Behalf of 
Kathy Sinnott, Member of European Parliament, Ireland, South; The Alliance Defense Fund on Behalf of the Family 
Research Council, Washington D.C., United States; The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, London, filed 
on Nov 14, 2008, before the European Court of Human Rights, at at paras. 17, 30-31, A, B, and C v. Ireland, App. No. 
25579/5, [2010] ECHR 2032 (2008).  
51 Written Comments By Center For Reproductive Rights [of New York], on April 14, 2005, before the European 
Court of Human Rights, as Amicus Curiae at paras. 9, 31-32, D v. Ireland, App. No. 26499/02 (2006), Pursuant To 
Rule 44, § 2 of the Rules of the Court.  
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detainees access to judicial process are not inconsistent with protecting national security.
52 Of 
course, many of the deliberative benefits depend on there being sufficient similarity among legal 
regimes and their contexts, a knotty problem, as noted further below.  
  Second, where one constitution has a genealogical or genetic relationship to another,
53  or 
where a constitution includes provisions embodying rights protected in widely subscribed to 
international human rights instruments, outsiders may have expert knowledge that is relevant to 
the domestic constitutional interpretive task.  For example, in recent cases in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, amicus briefs have been filed by British, Commonwealth and Canadian jurists on the 
meaning and history of the English writ of habeas corpus, from which the U.S. constitutional 
provision (the Suspension Clause) derived, or on international legal standards.
54  
Third, even in constitutions that do not incorporate international law as of constitutional 
stature, as in the United States, there are rule of law reasons to interpret a constitution so as not 
to obstruct compliance with international law.
55   Given the purposes of constitutions, in part, to 
constitute their countries as respected members of the international community, this is a 
reasonable interpretive canon to apply.  Of course, some constitutional challenges on rights 
based grounds can be rejected while still leaving the way open to comply with international legal 
obligations.  But making sure courts are aware of their international obligations, both in countries 
where international obligations are incorporated into the domestic constitution and those in 
which they are not, can play an appropriate role in constitutional adjudication in which experts in 
international law, both within and without the country, may have useful expertise to offer.  
 
                                                       
52 See, e.g., Brief for Specialists in Israeli Military Law and Constitutional Law as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at *2, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196), 2007 WL 2441592  
(explaining Israeli law on detainees to suggest that consequences of providing judicial process were not inconsistent 
with national security; arguing based on Israeli experience that “Judicial review of executive and military detention, 
the indispensable core of habeas corpus, need not be sacrificed to protect public safety and national security, even in 
the face of an unremitting terrorist threat”). 
53 See Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional 
Interpretation, 74 IND. L. J. 819, 839 (1999) (on “genealogical” relationships among constitutions); Louis Henkin, A 
New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 533, 536-38 (1993) 
(on “genetic” relationships among constitutions).   
54  See, e.g., Brief for the Commonwealth Lawyer’s Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at *4-9, 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196), 2007 WL 2414902  (setting out the English 
law of habeas corpus, including the scope of the writ in England at the time the U.S. Constitution was enacted); see 
also Brief of Amici Curiae Canadian Parliamentarians and Professors of Law in Support of Reversal at *10-18, 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196), 2007 WL 2456943 (discussing customary 
international law relating to treatment of foreign nationals and the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus).  
Although such briefs typically have a U.S. “counsel of record,” they nonetheless provide vehicles for information 
about and arguments from foreign legal sources. Thus, for example, in the Commonwealth Lawyer’s Ass’n Amicus 
Brief cited above,  the listed counsel were Sir Sydney Kentridge, Q.C., and Colin Nicholls, Q.C., , both of London, 
and   John Townsend Rich  {counsel of record) and  Stephen J. Pollak, of Goodwin Procter LLP, Washington, D.C. 
55 See JACKSON, supra note 49, at 157-58; cf. Yuval Shany, How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? 
Comparative Analysis of the Influence of International Human Rights Treaties Upon the Interpretation of 
Constitutional Texts by Domestic Courts, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 341, 349, 350–52 (2006). 
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B.   Relational Benefits of Outsider Interpretation: Externalities and Perceptions 
Outsider interventions may also serve the function of informing domestic constitutional 
actors of how different interpretive choices will be viewed by external audiences, or will affect 
their interests.  So, for example, in addition to informing the court of the nature of the 
international obligations to which its country is subject, this more relational purpose was perhaps 
one of the motivations for the EU to file amicus briefs before the U.S. Supreme Court on the 
constitutionality, under U.S. law, of imposing the death penalty as a punishment for those who 
are mentally disabled,
56 or juveniles, 
57 or on those who commit specific crimes, such as rape.
58   
Similarly, in several detainee cases in the U.S., foreign amici appeared to emphasize how actions 
by the U.S.  could adversely affect the development of international law in this area, and thereby 
also the interests of a variety of foreign actors.
59  
In such cases it is not necessarily the domestic constitution being specifically addressed 
(though it may be) but other sources – foreign law, or international law –which are claimed to be 
relevant to the domestic constitutional interpretation, and which carry a message, moreover, of 
the fact that other countries are concerned about the domestic interpretation.   
Are these more “relational” kinds of concerns legitimate sources in constitutional 
interpretation?  There is, of course, considerable normative contest on this point, given the 
disagreement that exists in many constitutional systems over both the role of pragmatic 
considerations in constitutional decision-making and the degree to which states should, in the 
first place, be committed to norms of transnational co-operation.   We do believe, however, that 
consideration of such views may potentially be legitimate in at least some contexts; and thus that 
increasing information about such concerns may also be legitimate.  This is particularly true, for 
example, where such “relational” interventions are motivated, not simply by ideological views 
and commitments, but rather by the kinds of economic or legal “externalities” that are believed 
                                                       
56 Brief for The European Union as Amicus Curiae in Shpport of Petitioner, at *2,  in McCarver v. North Carolina, 
O. T. 2001, No. 00-8727, cited in Adkins v Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n. 21 (2002). See also Joint Motion of all 
Amici in McCarver v. North Carolina, No. 00-8727 to Have Their McCarver Amicus Briefs Considered in This 
Case in Support of Petitioner at *1, Adkins v Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452), 2001 WL 1682012)). 
57 Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the International Community in Support of 
Respondent at *1, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1619203; Brief for the Human 
Rights Comm. of the Bar of England and Wales et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at *2-3, Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1628523. 
58 Brief for Leading British Law Associations, Scholars, Queen’s Counsel and Former Law Lords as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, at *25-26, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (No. 07-343),  2008 WL 706791  
(discussing British and international law and arguing that as a party to the ICCPR, the United States is obligated to 
limit use of the death penalty to the most serious crimes). 
59  See, e.g., Brief Of Amici Curiae Canadian Parliamentarians And Professors Of Law In Support Of Reversal at 
*2, Boumediene v Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196), 2007 WL 2456943 (explaining that “[h]ow 
this Court construes the obligations of the United States in relation to the treatment and prosecution of alien 
detainees in an inchoate and potentially indefinite campaign against terrorism will affect how other nations 
understand their own, identical obligations in this campaign and in future conflicts”). 
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by many to warrant consideration in domestic decision-making (or even to warrant the exercise 
of jurisdictional competences by higher levels of governance that include all affected persons).
60  
This does not mean that awareness of such views will, or should, necessarily affect a 
court’s ultimate understanding of its own domestic constitution.  Indeed, external voices will 
often be multi-valenced or cacophonous in a way that makes such influence unlikely; one need 
look no further than the very different views taken by different political actors in the United 
States about the Honduran situation in 2009 to see that external voices may be in conflict, on 
basic interpretive question, just as internal voices can be.  It simply means that, in some cases, 
domestic constitutional decision-makers should be willing to “engage” with such views,
61 so as, 
at least, to explain and account for their decisions in a way that can make them appear more 
respectful of the interests, and perspectives, of outsiders. 
C.   Outsiders and impartiality? 
It is sometimes the case that outsiders to a particular state may be in a better position to 
offer the kind of “impartial” evaluation that is often associated with the goal of independence in 
judging.
62  To be sure, like insiders, all “foreign” interpreters inevitably bring their own set of 
perspectives; indeed, as noted above, conveying their own interests in the “externalities” 
imposed by domestic decisions may at times be an important motivator for extraterritorial 
interpretation.  But outsiders will tend to have fewer direct interests than insiders in particular 
local decisional outcomes, and thus, may be somewhat better placed to offer the perspective of 
what Adam Smith called the “fair and impartial spectator”
63 – or at least, of a more distanced, 
and less intensely partial, third party.   
                                                       
60 Cf. Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship Between Constitutionalism 
in and Beyond the State, in RULING THE WORLD? INTERNATIONAL LAW, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 258, 262 (J. L. Dunoff & J. P. Trachtman eds., 2009); Daniel Halberstam, Constitutional 
Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United States, in RULING THE WORLD? 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, CONSTITUTIONALISM 326, 328-29 (J. L. Dunoff & J. P. Trachtman 
eds., 2009). 
61 For this concept of engagement, see Jackson, supra note 1; JACKSON, supra note 49. 
62 Whether impartiality is possible and whether understandings of law, as opposed to strategic power relations, ever 
constrain action in the international sphere, are important questions.  For present purposes we assume that although 
everyone is situated in interests and experience, and that “impartiality” as an ideal is not attainable, one can 
nonetheless speak of greater or lesser, or more direct and less direct, degrees of partiality; and we assume that 
international relations and state motivations are not limited to, but do not exclude concerns for, the legality (or 
perceived legality) of their actions.  
63 See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759, David Daiches Raphael & Alec Lawrence Macfie 
rev. ed. 1790). For an illuminating discussion of the idea of “open impartiality,” see also Amartya Sen, Open and 
Closed Impartiality, 99 J. Phil. 445, 445 (2002).   Outsiders are “better placed” in two senses: they may be more 
willing to offer their honest views and they may be able to develop an understanding of the law that is distanced 
from the particular stakes of local disputants. Outsiders may feel freer to offer critical perspectives, for example, if 
they do not face the potential political pressures on and/or reprisals against insiders who offer dissenting 
interpretations.   
How one views the motivations of foreign government actors will depend in part on broader theories of state 
behavior or international relations; under some theories, other governments may well have an interest in promoting 
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This, for example, is arguably one reason why in a number of Commonwealth nations 
“foreign” judges from other Commonwealth nations are allowed to sit on domestic courts of 
appeal.   At a minimum, this practice suggests that these outsiders are seen as no less 
trustworthy, or impartial, in constitutional matters than “insiders”,
64 and perhaps even that such 
judges are sometimes seen as more trustworthy or impartial.  Recent debates in the Caribbean 
over the potential abolition of appeals to the PC are illustrative:  in opposing the creation of a 
regional “Caribbean Court of Justice” to replace the PC in Jamaica, for example, the opposition 
leader repeatedly voiced concerns that members of the CCJ would be under a far greater 
“political shadow” than the privy councillors.
65 
Even the perception of increased independence –or distance –from domestic political 
pressures may also be particularly valuable in some cases where key insiders lack trust in one 
another.  This seems particularly likely, for example, in cases where states are emerging from a 
situation of violent civil conflict, in which warring factions have become parties to a new 
constitutional settlement.    In some of these post-conflict settings, an outside judge’s very lack 
of affiliation with participants in internal conflicts may be a source of appeal, of trustworthiness, 
and thus may be a reason why outsiders have been given a key vote on adjudicatory bodies 
responsible for enforcing the terms of instruments that are at once a constitution and a peace 
accord.
66  
                                                                                                                                                                               
the rule of law that might tend to produce a more impartial interpretive judgment.   “Outsiders” who are officials of 
other governments will typically be perceived to have interests associated with their own governments, though what 
those “interests” are will vary, and may include interests in the rule of law.   
64  For an example of a domestic constitution specifically authorizing foreign judges from certain other jurisdictions 
to sit on national courts, see CONST. BOTSWANA §100(3)(a) (discussing appointments to the Court of Appeal); 
id. §96(3)(a) (discussing appointment of judges to the High Court).  See also Sir Anthony Mason, Reflections of an 
Itinerant Judge in the Asia-Pacific Region, 28 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 311, 315–22 (2000) (describing his work as 
a judge on the high courts of Fiji, Solomon Islands and Hong Kong, following his retirement from the High Court of 
Australia); Gregory Dale, Appealing to Whom? Australia’s ‘Appellate Jurisdiction’ Over Nauru, 56 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 641, 642 (2007) (describing different models under which foreign judges hear cases: when “expatriate” 
judges are appointed to sit on national courts, as in Botswana; when appeals are to a supranational court, such as the 
Privy Council or the Caribbean Court of Justice; or when another country’s court is authorized to act as the court of 
appeals, as for Nauru).  In some systems, foreign judges may not have the same tenure protections as domestic 
judges, a practice that may raise issues of judicial independence, or may be seen as an accommodation to practical 
exigencies.  
65 Seaga renews calls for referendum on CCJ, JAMAICA OBSERVER (May 14, 2003), 
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/43759_Seaga-renews-calls-for-referendum-on-CCJ; see also Victor Jordan, 
A Critique of the Caribbean Court of Justice, Presentation at The Fifth Annual SALISES Conference, Trinidad and 
Tobago, at *6 (March 31, 2004), available at http://sta.uwi.edu/salises/workshop/csme/paper/vjordan.pdf.  
66  See CONST. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA art. VI para. 1(a)(providing that three out of nine judges on the 
Constitutional Court shall be appointed from outside the territory by the President of the European Court of Human 
Rights).  Technically, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted as part of the Dayton Accords.  See 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina art V & Annex 4, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 89; 
see also CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO art. 152 (2008), draft available at 
http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/?cid=2 (requiring, on a transitional basis, the appointment of three international 
judges, not from any neighboring country, by the International Civilian Representative to the Kosovo Constitutional 
Court) (last visited Nov. 21, 2011). 
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Of course, not all judges sitting in domestic courts experience in actuality the kind of 
independence to which international and domestic norms of impartiality aspire, and not all 
significant constitutional questions come before courts, as the Honduran situation illustrates.
67  
Executive branch officials do not necessarily act with the same norms of impartiality as do the 
courts of their countries.  Thus, in a fraught situation like that of Honduras, the motivation of 
outside constitutional interpreters like the United States might have been thought to be 
ideological, in opposition to the redistributive policies of Zelaya, rather than based on concern 
with rule of law or democracy values; likewise, the actions of the OAS may have been perceived 
as motivated more by the fear of incumbent heads of state not to be displaced than by a bona fide 
concern for the domestic constitutional order of Honduras.   
Similarly, in Fiji in 2006 and Afghanistan in 2009, it is also extremely complex to 
determine whether various constitutional interventions by the U.S. were in fact “independent” 
and “impartial”, or rather arguably more self-interested.  By suspending aid to Fiji under the 
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act (which 
prohibits granting “any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of 
government is deposed by a military coup or decree”),
68 the United States implicitly rejected the 
constitutional arguments of the 2006 coup-leaders in favor of the validity of the coup.
69  But at 
the same time, in opposing full-scale sanctions or opposition to the coup, diplomatic cables 
recently released by Wikileaks suggest that the United States was motivated at least in part by a 
desire to retain Fijian peacekeepers in Iraq.
70  Other countries in the region, such as Australia, by 
contrast, which had a stronger interest in regional stability, sought to support their interpretation 
of the 2006 coup as unconstitutional by arguing that Fijian peacekeepers should be replaced by 
peacekeepers from Nepal.
71 
Likewise, in Afghanistan, the United States arguably had a similar strategic interest in 
advancing an interpretation of the Afghan constitution that, as Part II notes, gave precedence to 
Art 33 (universal access to voting) over Art 61 (elections within a certain period of the expiration 
                                                       
67 The  principal judicial involvement in the Honduran narrative leading up to then-President Zelaya’s removal was 
the action of lower courts, enjoining the President’s efforts to hold a referendum on constitutional revision, and the 
Supreme Court’s agreement with the issuance of warrants allowing for entry into the President’s house and for his 
arrest.  See NOAH FELDMAN ET AL., REPORT TO THE COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION OF HONDURAS: 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 38, 42 (2011) [hereinafter Feldman Report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission]. 
The Court did not explain its decision on the arrest warrant.  Id. 
68 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub L. No. 109-102, § 508, 119 
Stat. 2172, 2197 (2005); see also U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Embassy in Suva, U.S. Policy Towards Fiji: Section 
7008, http://suva.usembassy.gov/section_7008.html.  
69 US Suspends Aid to Post-coup Fiji, BBC NEWS, Dec. 20, 2006. 
70 Luke Miller, Wikileaks: U.S. redlined Australia’s Fiji coup sanctions, CRIKEY (May 2, 2011), 
http://www.crikey.com.au/2011/05/02/wikileaks-us-redlined-australias-fiji-coup-sanctions/.  
71 Iliesa Tora, Fiji Soliders ‘Top Choice’, FIJI SUN (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.fijisun.co/2011/09/07/fiji-soldiers-
%E2%80%98top-choice%E2%80%99/. 
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of a presidential term), and thus favored a 3-month delay in the calling of elections.
72   Both the 
actual, and perceived, success of democratic elections in Afghanistan was seen as critical, by the 
United States, to the ability to withdraw military force from Afghanistan (itself an important 
foreign policy objective).  By 2009, key policy makers in the United States were also 
increasingly doubtful as to whether the re-election of President Karzai would help serve those 
broader objectives:
73 timing the elections in a way that undermined, rather than helped, Karzai 
win re-election was therefore, arguably, consistent with broader U.S. policy objectives.  
This suggests that it would be an error to simply conflate impartiality with outsider status, 
when outsiders may be motivated –or may be perceived to be motivated – by an agenda 
unrelated to the bona fides of a domestic interpretation.
74  Rather, whether outside interventions 
can be understood to benefit from the same kind of impartiality associated with the use of 
foreign, independent judges will be a highly uncertain and context dependent question.  
 IV.   Drawbacks of Outsider Intervention 
The potential drawbacks or disadvantages of outsider interpretation, particularly in its 
more coercive forms, are several. First, there are questions of limited expertise, and limited 
comparability, that may diminish the deliberative advantages thought to accrue from such 
extraterritorial constitutional interpretation.  Second, relational aspects of interventions come 
with their own possible dark side, as they may risk eliciting a kind of nationalistic, 
exceptionalist, raising of barriers against foreign influence; how likely this reaction is to occur 
will depend on different national political cultures.  Likewise, outsider interpretations may suffer 
from a “democracy deficit”, a form of “illegitimacy” that relates to their being outsiders and not 
subject to the corrective accountability mechanisms of local democracy.  Relatedly, there may be 
jurisprudential or methodological commitments that limit the openness of domestic actors to 
receiving outsider advice. 
A. Expertise and comparability: Just as outsiders may be able to offer useful information, 
for deliberative purposes, about sources relevant to domestic constitutional interpretation, at the 
same time they may lack the local knowledge of the entire structure and history of the particular 
national constitution. It is the very distance from local constitutional politics, which gives 
outsiders some claim to impartiality in debates over constitutional meanings, that also limits their 
local constitutional knowledge.  This lack of local knowledge may also mean that outsider 
understandings of a particular (foreign) constitutional text, or transnational development of an 
international text, may not be found relevant to the interpretation even of similar texts in a 
domestic constitution in its full context; what the outside experts have expertise on may not be 
                                                       
72 See supra text at note 30. See also CASEY L. ADDIS AND KENNETH KATZMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, MIDDLE EAST ELECTIONS 2009: LEBANON, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ 9–10 (May 19, 2009) (stating that 
U.S. interests are more likely to be harmed by elections tainted by fraud or violence than the ultimate outcome). 
73 Dexter Filkins, Leader of Afghanistan Finds Himself Hero No More, N.Y TIMES (Feb. 7, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/08/world/asia/08karzai.html?ref=hamidkarzai. 
74 Compare Ali-Ali, supra note 6 (noting that, in the context of outsider influences over constitutional design “where 
a specific state actor has an interest – political or economic– in the outcome of a particular drafting process, some of 
its contributions to the drafting process can be less than benign”). 
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controlling in the face of local expertise and interpretive approaches. Additionally, foreign 
experts may sometimes simply make ‘mistakes’ about parallels between their own domestic 
constitutional norms and practices and the relevance of these norms in a foreign constitutional 
context. 
Take the 2009 Honduran constitutional crisis and the (initial) response of the U.S. and 
other international actors to the constitutionality of Zelaya’s removal.  Opponents of the removal 
characterized it as an unconstitutional military coup, and indeed, the military had arrested Zelaya 
and sent him out of the country; the national legislature, which voted to remove Zelaya from 
office, acted without explicit authority in the constitution’s text, which did authorize the 
Supreme Court to rule on impeachments of public officials. Yet proponents of his removal 
argued that Zelaya had violated the constitutional order, by implicitly advocating for repeal of 
the limitation on a single term presidency (by calling for a popular referendum on holding a 
constitutional convention to write an entirely new constitution) and by defying earlier orders of 
the country’s “contentious-administrative” court in connection with that issue;
75 they argued 
further that the removal of Zelaya by the elected Congress was in accord with the Congress’ 
larger powers under (and the purposes of) the Constitution.
76  Zelaya was replaced by an elected 
                                                       
75 Feldman Report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 67, at 31, 42, 45-46. Cf. Edward 
Schumacher-Matos, A Dose of Realism in Honduras, WASH. POST, July 12, 2009, at A11 (arguing that the Honduran 
Supreme Court did what it was empowered to do; questioning whether to characterize Zelaya's ouster as a coup; and 
stating that accordingly Obama and Clinton have ceased calling it a coup).  The Feldman report agreed that the 
Supreme Court had acted properly in issuing an arrest warrant for Zelaya, id. at 46, but noted that the Court itself 
never ruled on Zelaya’s removal from office: id. at 21.  But cf. Law Library of Congress, Honduras: Constitutional 
Law Issues, available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/honduras/constitutional-law-issues.php (prepared by Norma C. 
Gutierrez, August 2009)  (last updated April 4, 2011), text at notes 48, 49  [hereafter Law Library of Congress 
Report](“In light of the fact that Zelaya was formally removed from office on June 28 by the Congressional Decree 
described above, on June 29, the Supreme Court unanimously ordered that the proceedings be forwarded to the 
Unified District Trial Court to continue through the ordinary proceedings established by the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, ‘given that citizen José Manuel Zelaya Rosales is no longer a high-ranking government official.’ ”)   
76 Law Library of Congress Report, supra note 75, text at notes 39-42; Feldman Report to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, supra note 67 at 55-56 (noting that Zelaya’s opponents interpreted Congress’ right to 
remove a sitting president broadly, in light of specific constitutional prohibitions against attempts to modify the 
constitution).   One clearly illegal aspect of what occurred, however was President Zelaya’s removal from the 
country, which appeared to have been undertaken by the military not in conformity with the provisions of the arrest 
warrant; even commentators who generally supported Zelaya’s removal from office were agreed on the illegality of 
his removal from the country. See, e.g., Miguel A. Estrada, Honduras' non-coup, LOS ANGELES TIMES (July 10, 
2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/10/opinion/oe-estrada10 (concluding that Zelaya’s removal to another 
country “most likely wasn't [lawful]”); Law Library of Congress Report, text at note 50; see also Feldman Report to 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission at 47-48 n.157 (concluding that the Armed Forces’ removal of Zelaya 
from the country was “not legal, but instead constituted the disobeying both of the judicial warrant and an 
unconstitutional expatriation”). It was recently reported that the Honduran Supreme Court, by a 12 to 3 vote, upheld 
a decision dismissing charges against the military joint chiefs for having forcibly removed Zelaya from the country; 
it is also reported that the military chiefs had claimed a defense of necessity.  See Honduras Culture and Politics: 
Supreme Blessing on the Coup (Wednes. October 19, 2011) at https: 
//hondurasculturepolitics.blogspot.com/2011/10/supreme-blessing-on-the-coup.html.  
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member of the Parliament who was next in the constitutional line of succession; elections 
scheduled for December 2009 were held and a third person was elected president.
77  
Is it possible that assumptions about their own constitutional orders may have obscured 
the complexity of the constitutional situation in Honduras to those outsiders looking at the 
situation in its immediate aftermath? 
78 Under the 1982 Honduran constitution,
79 an 
extraordinary emphasis is placed on the importance of a single term presidency, which President 
Zelaya’s actions in prior months were believed by many to threaten. For example, the single term 
presidency is included in description of the basic character of Honduras as a representative 
democracy found in Article 4 of the Honduras Constitution, which states: “Alternation in the 
exercise of the Presidency of the Republic is obligatory.  Violation of this norm constitutes a 
crime of treason against the Fatherland.” The Honduran Constitution includes several other 
provisions designed to secure its one term rule, in provisions that relate to citizenship, 
amendments, advocacy of unlawful amendments, and the Armed Forces.  Article 42 states that 
among the grounds for loss of citizenship is “inciting, promoting, or abetting the continuation in 
office or the reelection of the President of the Republic;” the declaration of loss of citizenship on 
this ground shall be made by a “government resolution, based on a prior condemnatory sentence 
dictated by the competent tribunals”.
80 Article 239 provides that no one who has been president 
may again be a president or president designate, and that anyone “who violates this provision or 
                                                       
77 Feldman Report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 67; Rory Carroll, Honduras Elects 
Portofino Lobo as New President, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 30, 2009.  On the constitutionality of Michelletti’s 
succession, see Library of Congress Report, supra note 75, at text at note 37-38.  
78 Part of the following paragraphs are drawn from Vicki C. Jackson, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: 
A Lens Into Constitutional Theory and Transnational Constitutionalism, forthcoming as Reformas constitucionales 
inconstitucionales: una mirada a la teoría constitucional y el constitucionalismo transnacional, in Esteban Restrepo 
Saldarriaga (coordinador), LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN ENTRE TRADICIÓN Y RENOVACIÓN. ENSAYOS EN HOMENAJE A 
OWEN FISS (2012) (en preparación).  See also Frank M. Walsh, The Honduran Constitution is not a Suicide Pact: 
The Legality of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya’s Removal, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 339, 362-63 (2010). 
79  We rely in this paper on the English translation of the Honduran Constitution available through Constitutions of 
the Countries of the World [CCW] (Oceana Law). See Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, 1982 (as amended 
to 1991), Oceana Law, http://www.oceanalaw.com/NXT/gateway.dll/CCW/current/honduras/hnd_constitution.htm 
(as accessed July 16, 2009).  A caution:  In this translation, notes existed only through 1995 in the CCW 
introduction, and scholars have disagreed about the import of Section 205(15) of the Honduras Constitution and its 
history. See infra note 65. Moreover, the U.S. State Department website indicates that the Honduran Constitution 
was amended in 1999, so some of the provisions which are referred to in the text may no longer be extant, though 
several of them correspond to what has been reported elsewhere, in the press and in scholarly articles. The 
importance of having a full and up to date translation is emphasized by the disagreement between some scholars 
writing on the crisis about whether the impeachment referral procedure, by which the Congress could refer the 
question of removal of the President to the Supreme Court, remained available at the time of Zelaya’s ouster.  
Compare Walsh, supra note 78, at 368-71 (stating that the provisions had been removed through inartful drafting of 
an amendment designed to remove the immunity for legislators) with Doug Cassel, Honduras: Coup d'Etat in 
Constitutional Clothing?, ASIL INSIGHTS, July 29, 2009, available at 
http://www.asil.org/files/insight090729pdf.pdf,  text at notes 44-45 & note 61 (suggesting that the impeachment 
referral process was available and had been suggested by one member of the Congress at the time).   
80 We have not read anything that suggests that there was a process that took place to declare the president’s 
citizenship was terminated. 
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advocates its amendment....shall immediately cease to hold ...offic[e] and shall be disqualified 
for ten years from exercising any public function.”
81 In addition to making violation of the term 
limit a criminal offense of treason, and imposing on anyone who even advocates for such an 
amendment an immediate loss of public office and a 10-year disqualification from office, the 
Constitution goes to even great lengths to secure this as a permanent feature.
82  There is thus at 
least some basis to argue that there was a clear basic norm in the Honduran constitution that 
President Zelaya’s actions in prior months seemed plausibly to threaten.   
To those accustomed to the constitutions of the United States, Canada or Australia, 
however, this emphasis on single-term presidencies has a quite unfamiliar quality.  Indeed, to 
U.S. ears, the provisions of the Honduran constitution prohibiting even the advocacy of a change 
in the unamendable provisions of the constitution limiting presidents to a single term might 
themselves have seemed suspect, or inconsistent with general (transnational or international) 
standards of freedom of expression.  It is thus not surprising that, initially at least, most outside 
actors were also emphatic in arguing that the removal of President Zelaya, for violation of these 
limits, was “unconstitutional.”
 83  
                                                       
81 For thoughtful discussion of the legitimacy of constitutional provisions prohibiting advocacy for change in 
unamendable constitutional provisions, see Walter F. Murphy, Merlin's Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of 
the Once and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 163, 184-87 (S. Levinson eds., 1995) (distinguishing the constitutional legitimacy from the wisdom of 
restricting such advocacy;  suggesting that if it is legitimate to make some provision unamendable, it is also 
legitimate to prohibit advocacy for such a change, but it will often be wise or prudent not to limit such advocacy).   
82   The Armed Forces are specifically charged by the Constitution with protecting the single term rule:  Article 272 
provides for a permanent and professional Armed Forces, who are “established to defend the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the Republic, to maintain peace, public order and the rule of the Constitution, the principles of free 
suffrage and alternation in the exercise of the Presidency of the Republic” CONST. HONDURAS art. 272 (emphasis 
added).   Finally, Article 374 states that articles of the Constitution  “relating to the form of government, national 
territory, the presidential term, the prohibition from reelection to President of the Republic, the citizen who  has 
served as president under any title, and to persons who may not be President of the Republic for the subsequent 
period may not be amended.” Id. at art 374 (emphasis added). In a substantial work in progress that he was kind 
enough to share with us after our paper was in draft, Professor Steven Schnably explores the Honduran situation in 
great detail, as presenting a situation of  “deep disagreements about the correct interpretation of the Honduran 
constitution”.  See Steven Schnably, External Construction of Constitutions: Honduras and Beyond (work in 
progress) (analyzing both factual uncertainty and legal uncertainty as challenges in evaluating outsider or “exernal” 
constitutional interpretations).  [PERMISSION NEEDED AND REQUESTED] 
83 Compare, e.g., Cassel, supra note 79 (arguing that the action of the Congress in removing Zelaya from office, first 
based on an alleged but fictitious resignation letter and then based on his failure to appear (produced by the unlawful 
removal) was thus itself also plainly unlawful) and Feldman Report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
supra note _,at 59-61 (concluding that the Congress lacked authority to remove the President) with Law Library of 
Congress, Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues, available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/honduras/constitutional-
law-issues.php (prepared by Norma C. Gutierrez, August 2009)  (last updated April 4, 2011) (concluding that the 
Congress had interpretive authority to decide on the scope of its power to “censure” the President) and Walsh,  supra 
note 78, at 365-66, 369-70 (arguing that because a prior amendment had inadvertently removed provisions for an 
impeachment procedure, and the Constitution thus provided no textually explicit procedure for removing a 
President, the actions of the Congress were in accord with the spirit of the Constitution given the threat the President 
posed to the constitutional order and the rule of law by his defiance of court orders and efforts to circumvent 
unamendable provisions of the constitution). The Library of Congress report has been sharply criticized, for asserted 
failures of research into Honduran constitutional law, over-reliance on a single outside source, and developing an 
interpretation of the Constitution not advanced by any of the internal participants. See Letter to James Billington, 
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While such outsiders may well have had the better arguments on whether the Honduran 
Congress had constitutional authority to remove a sitting President,
84 the strength of the position 
initially taken by outsiders on the issue was surprising.
85 The certainty that what had occurred 
was an unconstitutional military coup was evidently not tempered by an understanding of 
possible prior unconstitutional acts by the President, nor by the potential for reasonable 
competing interpretations of legislative power, involving, inter alia, the need for removal of a 
president for violation of a central constitutional provision and the (arguable) power of the 
Honduran Congress to engage in constitutional interpretation about the scope of its own 
powers.
86   
                                                                                                                                                                               
Librarian of Congress, from Senator John Kerry, Chair, Sen. Comm. on For’n. Relations and Rep. Harold Berman, 
Chair, House Comm. Foreign Affairs (Oct. 27, 2009), available at 
http://thehill.com/images/stories/news/2009/october/102909/bermantoloc.pdf; Letter to Librarian Billington and 
Director Mulhollan, from Professor Rosemary Joyce, Chair, Anthropology Dept, University of California Berkeley 
(Sept. 25, 2009), available at http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/2130/68/.  
84 See Report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 67, at 6, 60 (concluding that the Honduran 
Congress “most likely” acted without authority in removing the President, and construing the legislature’s power to 
“censure” the president as not extending so far as to have permitted Zelaya’s removal). (For a contemporaneous 
report of a conspiracy between the Honduran parliament, the Supreme Court and the military unconstitutionally to 
remove Zelaya, see http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/07/09TEGUCIGALPA645.html (“Wikileaks” document, 
purporting to be a  cable form the U.S. Ambassador in Honduras to the U.S. State Department, July 2009). The 
Feldman report explains in detail its reasons for concluding that it is “most likely” that Congress acted improperly in 
removing Zelaya from office, including the absence of a proceeding in which Zelaya could contest the charges 
against him.  Id. at 60. For purposes of this essay, what is important is the debatable character of the conclusion in 
2009.  For the contrary conclusion of  the report prepared for the Library of Congress, see Law Library of Congress 
Report, supra note 75, text at notes 40-43 (concluding, inter alia, “that the National Congress made use of its 
constitutional prerogative to interpret the Constitution and interpreted the word ‘disapprove’ to include also the 
removal from office”). The Honduran Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in July 2011, released a final report in 
which it described the Congress’ action in removing Zelaya as a coup d’état against the executive, though also 
finding that Zelaya had engaged in illegal acts leading up to the removal. COMISIÓN DE LA VERDAD Y LA 
RECONCILIACIÒN, PARA QUE LOS HECHOS NO SE REPITAN: INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN DE LA VERDAD Y LA 
RECONCILIACIÓN 202 (2011), available at http://www.cvr.hn/assets/Documentos-PDF/Informes-Finales/TOMO-I-
FINAL.pdf.  It has quite recently been reported that the Honduran Supreme Court, in October 2011, up[ehld (by a 
vote of 12-3) a decision dismissing charges against the military joint chiefs for having forcibly removed Zelaya from 
the country; ti is reported that the military chiefs had claimed a defense of necessity.  See Honduras Culture and 
Politics: Supreme Blessing on the Coup (Wednes. October 19, 2011) at https: 
//hondurasculturepolitics.blogspot.com/2011/10/supreme-blessing-on-the-coup.html.  
85   Note that under the 2001 Democratic Charter, only an “unconstitutional disruption of the democratic order”  
warrants suspension. Inter-American Democratic Charter, art. 21, Sept. 11, 2001, available at 
http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Documents/Democractic_Charter.htm.  This phrase is ambiguous. It might mean 
that both a violation of domestic constitutional law  (“unconstitutional”) of a substantial degree (“disruption”), that 
is also inconsistent with international understandings of the “democratic order” are required; or the phrase, might 
refer to a “democratic order” as specified in the particular national constitution.  This interpretive question about the 
meaning of article 21 relates, inter alia, to whether Zelaya’s actions, if unconstitutional, were also a “disruption of 
the democratic order”; if these words (“disruption of the democratic order”) are judged only by international 
standards, they might not include the particular “democratic order”  represented by the Honduran constitution’s 
protection against multi-term presidencies.  
86 The military’s removal of Zelaya from the country clearly was unconstitutional under the Honduras constitution, 
which prohibits the expatriation of a citizen. CONST. HONDURAS art. 102.  Even those who generally defended the 
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B. Relational Complications of Impartiality Claims: Claims by outsiders that are 
perceived to convey the idea that outsider views matter because of their source (or because of 
relationships among the states in question) may have unintended, perverse consequences.  They 
may occasion pushback and may, at least in the short run, diminish support for the legal position 
being asserted, as national states often provide a locus for the expression of nationalism, which 
can in turn develop into xenophobic resistance to the “foreign.”   A good example of this was the 
popular backlash in Nicaragua, in 2009, to the criticisms of the CSJ by the U.S. Ambassador, 
Robert Callahan: Following the Ambassador’s comments, thousands of demonstrators gathered 
outside the U.S. Embassy shouting “Get out”, “Get out” to the Ambassador, and scrawling 
“Yankees go home” on the Embassy walls,
87 despite the fact that leading local opposition 
figures, and members of the judiciary, had expressed almost identical positions to those of the 
Ambassador on the issue.
88 
Especially in those parts of the world which tend to have less well-developed rule of law 
practices, efforts by those from wealthier parts of the world, where the rule of law may be better 
developed, to insist on their interpretations of domestic constitutions, may not be regarded as 
impartially motivated.  Rather they may be seen as part of an ideology of constitutional 
imperialism,
89 or of economic oppression, an insistence on the rule of law (after wealth has been 
distributed through lawless rule by those more powerful) as a way of preventing those less 
powerful from making social and economic progress.  
C. Democracy, “Fit,” Legitimacy and Self-Authorship:  Jurisprudential and 
methodological commitments also may limit the utility of outsider interpretations.  Consideration 
of structure and specific history may condition the meaning applied, even to terms that appear 
identical or similar to those in other constitutions.
90 Apart from considerations of structure and 
specific histories, constitutions are often subject to norms of coherence in interpretation, in ways 
that rules of international law are not.  Interpretation of specific terms may need to “fit” with a 
broader range of structures and other judicially determined doctrine.  
                                                                                                                                                                               
removal of Zelaya from office have conceded the unlawfulness of the military’s action in removing him from the 
country. See supra note 76. 
87 See e.g. “Nicaraguans Protest Remarks by U.S. Envoy”, THE NEW YORK TIMES, October 30, 2009. 
88 See Witte-Lebhar, supra note 47, “Nicaragua’s Chief Justice Denounces Pro-Ortega Ruling”, Latin American 
Herald Tribune (Chief Justice. Manuel Martinez called the method of establishing a quorum for the case illegal); 
“World Briefing: The Americas; Nicaragua: Dispute Over Election”, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 21, 2009 (“opponents 
call the decision illegal and vow to fight it”). 
89  For one example, consider the United States’ insistence that the provisions of the “Platt Amendment,” including 
provisions authorizing the United States to intervene in Cuba to “preserve[] Cuban independence [and]  maintai[n] a 
government adequate for the protection of life, liberty and individual property…., ” be included in the new Cuban 
Constitution drafted in 1900-01.  See Christina Duffy Burnett, A Guarantee Clause for the Americas: The United 
States in Cuba, 1898-1902, (forthcoming, Constitutional Commentary); see also Paul Carrington, Could and Should 
America Have Made an Ottoman Republic in 1919?, 49 WM & MARY L. REV. 1071, 1086-87 & n. 97 (2008).    
90 For example, see JACKSON, supra note 49, at 203-05  (discussing how the specific institutional structures and 
historic concerns of Canadian federalism contributed to a much narrower meaning of a text, similar to (but as a pure 
matter of text even broader than) that in the U.S. Constitution, giving the national government power over “trade and 
commerce”). 
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Furthermore, positivist commitments, especially when combined with democratic 
ideologies, might well insist on the meanings attributed by particular national lawmakers to 
constitutional provisions, regardless of their origins.  Although one of us has argued that foreign 
experience can, under specified circumstances, contribute to a better understanding of one 
polity’s democratic preferences,
91 given the nationalistic exceptionalism that, as a matter of 
sociological reality,  may accompany interpretive methods linked to democratic views, 
experiences elsewhere may be viewed as unpersuasive to the meaning of national constitutional 
commitments.   Moreover, classical international law may lend support to “democratic” or 
“sovereigntist” objections to outsider efforts to influence domestic constitutional interpretation.
92 
Indeed, it is often suggested that for domestic courts even to consider, on their own, the 
views and practices of other nations is to violate or interfere with the operation of domestic 
democracy.
93   A fortiori, it could be suggested, for foreign actors to offer, or especially, to try to 
impose their views of another country’s laws on that country raises concerns, particularly since 
public law is often strongly associated with particular national histories, compromises, and 
interdependent institutions.  In the first case, many scholars, including Mark Tushnet, 
94  have 
responded that so long as it is a domestic judge doing the evaluation of the relevance and bearing 
of the foreign or international source, the concern from democracy is no different than when the 
judge considers domestic historical sources, or scholarship, in coming to an interpretive 
conclusion. 
95 The same rationale is not available, however, where an outsider purports to offer 
an interpretation of another country’s own laws.  
In the Caribbean, for example, a major factor driving debate over the role of the PC in 
recent years has been a concern about democracy and the death penalty:  a quite clear majority of 
people in most Caribbean countries favor retention of capital punishment, and most national 
constitutions in the region also reflect this via the inclusion of “savings clauses” designed to 
protect the death penalty.
96  The PC, however, has consistently interpreted Caribbean 
                                                       
91 See Dixon, supra note 49. 
92 See e.g. United Nations Charter, Art 2(7) (providing that “[n]othing … in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter”). Newer forms of international 
law, involving human rights, are in some tension with these ideas, and might be invoked to support “outsider” 
interpretation of domestic constitutions claimed to be more consistent with international human rights law. Compare 
Ali-Ali, supra note 6 at 89-90 (discussing the significance of this erosion in the context of external influences over 
constitutional design).  
93 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court (The Supreme Court, 2004 Term), 119 Harv. L. Rev. 
31, 88-89 (2005).  
94 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, When is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over 
Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1286-87, 1296-97 (2006). 
95 Id. at 1296-97 (arguing that non-U.S. law may merely be used as a source for a domestic judge’s thinking, and 
that if mistaken interpretation of foreign law is a concern, this argument is not “distinctive” as judges frequently 
have poor knowledge of complex areas of domestic law).   
96 Joanna Harrington, The Challenge to the Mandatory Death Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean, 98 Am. J. 
Int’l. L. 126, 126-28 (2004).   
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constitutions in a way that narrows scope for the use of the death penalty,
97 so that, in recent 
years, a major reason for opposition to the PC, as an outside interpreter, has been its role in 
capital cases. 
Finally, there may be costs to both local democracy and local constitutionalism if 
countries struggling to make a transition to democratic constitutionalism are the objects of too 
much, or certain forms, of outsider interpretation and advice about their own constitution, 
especially if such outsider interpretations are acted on because of their provenance.  Even 
assuming good faith, relatively impartial and knowledgeable outsider advice (for example, from 
nonaligned NGOs who assisted in a transition period), it might be thought that receiving and/or 
acting on such advice might make it more difficult to develop local commitments and 
attachments to democratic system and to the state’s constitution, commitments that may require a 
certain amount of struggling together towards solutions. 
IV.   The Potential Risks & Benefits of Outsider Interpretation: A Contextual Analysis  
  As we have seen, there are competing claims of expertise, competence and legitimacy 
associated with interpretive insiders and outsiders. Working through the factors discussed in 
parts II and III, in the context of the five questions laid out in the introduction – who, by what 
means, how, when and for what reason is outsider interpretation occurring– may give rise to 
some tentative conclusion about the directions in which different configurations of these factors 
might point. 
 A.  Who and By What Means: Identity and Coercion 
Who is engaged in the practice of outside constitutional interpretation will matter for a 
number of reasons:  it may affect the impartiality of outsiders, their level of competence or 
expertise, and also the degree to which they are likely to be involved in coercive forms of 
interpretation.  Possible interpretive interventions by scholars, NGOs, international and domestic 
courts, and executive branch officials should thus be separately considered in assessing the 
merits of outsider constitutional interpretation.    
One might begin by thinking, for example, that scholars, writing in their customary 
academic fora, may be most capable of relative impartiality and independence of judgment about 
how to interpret another state’s internal constitution, while executive branch officials of other 
countries perhaps least so.  The institutional security, and reputational motivations, of scholars 
suggests that, even if their interests may be at some level aligned with those of their country of 
origin, they will often be well placed to offer a more impartial view.  Executive officials, on the 
other hand, will almost always be influenced by national diplomatic, military, security or 
economic interests in the process of interpretation; while these perspectives may be of value in 
understanding relational concerns, they also offer a more limited form of impartiality as to the 
meaning of legal texts. 
A further important difference between scholarly work, on the one hand, and executive 
decisions, on the other, has to do with their coercive effects.   Scholarly work, even if intended as 
critique or influence, generally lacks the coercive force that almost any government action does.  
                                                       
97 See, e.g., Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney General for Jamaica, [1994] 2 AC 1. 
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From this perspective, then, it is less problematic and errors in scholarship can ordinarily be 
corrected by responsive academic writing.  Concomitantly, the benefits of leaving scholarly 
inquiry free, if unconnected with attempts at coercion, are ordinarily so great that even poor or 
misinformed scholarship should not be viewed as posing a significant threat to legitimate 
governmental interests of the countries commented on.    
International governmental organizations, such as the United Nations or Organization of 
American States (OAS), will also tend, in this respect, to be closer to national executive officials, 
than scholars, in that they can generally rely on member states to enforce their judgments via a 
range of coercive (or quasi-coercive) measures.  Compared to national actors, however, IGO’s 
may be regarded as more impartial, given the degree to which their policies or judgments are 
informed by an ‘overlapping consensus’ among countries.
98 
International NGOs, in most cases, will be closer to scholars than executive officials with 
respect to their potential for coercive power.
 99  While some NGO’s may exist for the purpose of 
monitoring “rule of law” compliance in states around the world, NGOs typically have less 
coercive power – less power to invoke sanctions, less money to dole out as incentives – than 
state actors.   Nonetheless, given the increasing role of such civil society groups, it is important 
for NGOs to be aware of the difficulties and challenges of outsider constitutional interpretation, 
and in particular, the limits on their own impartiality and expertise:  expertise in international 
law, for example, may not translate directly into expertise in domestic constitutional provisions 
that are similar in their text to the international rules. 
Courts might be thought to occupy a middle-ground between scholars, on the one hand, 
and executive officials, on the other: courts issue judgments; the judgments are intended to be 
binding and to have force and effect.  If a judgment is premised on an interpretation of another 
country’s constitution and that judgment has coercive effects on or concerning the other country, 
it is important that such an attempted use of power be justified.   Thus, international courts will, 
generally, exercise jurisdiction only with the presence of state consent; the scope of the state’s 
consent, however, may matter. Under most human rights treaties with protocols permitting 
individual complaints, for example, the authorization would be to evaluate the conformity of the 
state’s behavior with the international rule set forth in the particular treaty.  Do international 
norms generally require adherence to domestic constitutional requirements?  That is one of the 
key questions raised by this phenomenon.
100 More commonly, however, for courts, the point of 
                                                       
98  To the extent that an IGO is regarded as captured by a single dominant power, this perceived impartiality 
advantage would diminish.   
99  As for impartiality and interests, there is of course a very wide range of variation among NGOs, and some NGOs 
will be aligned with a particular set of interests that might be regarded as skewing their perspectives – whether the 
interest be in an expansive view of human rights being reflected in all legal instruments, or it be an International 
Chamber of Commerce view that regulation should be kept to a minimum in order to promote free trade.  These 
interests may be more readily identified and accounted for than are the typically far more complex national interests 
that motivate positions taken by executive branch officials when speaking about other countries’ laws. Compare also 
Ali-Ali, supra note 6 (discussing similar questions of institutional identity, in the context of questions of external 
influences on constitutional design). 
100 See further note 134, infra. 
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referring to other countries’ constitutional practices in domestic constitutional adjudication is not 
to engage in venturesome interpretation, nor to criticize the doctrine of other courts, but rather to 
note their content and discuss what that content suggests about the problem of interpretation 
before the domestic court.  In this sense, judicial decisions that refer to foreign constitutional law 
are rarely designed directly to change that country’s laws, or to have even indirect coercive 
effect.
101  And they are, at least arguably, less likely to be influenced by the kinds of foreign 
policy or other “external” concerns that are so significant in the executive branch.  For these and 
other reasons, “outsider” interpretations by courts may offer greater ‘impartiality’ than 
equivalent forms of executive branch interpretation. 
These are general, institutional aspects of identity.  Other aspects of identity may also be 
of considerable importance to the effects of any proposed intervention on a domestic 
constitutional matter.  If the outside commenter is a former colonial power, for example, the 
likely impact of its intervention on its former colony will depend on contextual factors going to 
their relationship.
102   
Similarly, if the commenter is from a country that is generally allied with the state, with 
which there are shared legal cultures, such outside comments may be more likely to be found 
relevant than from more distantly related states.
103 Such commenters are also more likely to be 
familiar with a country’s constitutional system, as a whole, and thus to intervene productively in 
a specific constitutional dispute.  In this sense, the question of who is engaged in the practice of 
outside constitutional interpretation will be closely linked to the question of to whom the 
interpretation is directed.
104  
Yet it is also important to acknowledge that proximity may increase the sensitivity of 
outsider comments on interpretation, if there is a history of competition between the states in 
question, or of disputes, for example, over access to the sea for landlocked countries.   The same 
applies to outsiders with close territorial, or cultural, connections to a particular jurisdiction: 
ambassadors or special representatives to a region, for example, may sometimes be perceived by 
local actors as more informed about, and sensitive to, local concerns than other (more 
                                                       
101 Even if there is no intent to influence other countries’ interpretations of their own laws, those countries may react 
adversely to the characterizations of their laws by international or foreign tribunals.   
102 Although many independent states that were once colonies have long since replaced their initial, independence 
constitutions, one could imagine that – in the case of a constitution seen to have been imposed by colonial or 
occupying powers – efforts by such powers to offer interpretations about the meaning of those texts might be 
particularly unwelcome.  More generally, this essay generally assumes the validity and legitimacy of each nation’s 
constitution; but there may be states in which this assumption is incorrect, and in which, for example, international 
law would be seen as having greater legitimacy than national constitutional law.  In those cases the balance of 
factors might favor extraterritorial interpretations grounded on international law norms.   
103 On the idea of distinct trans-national legal cultures, and their importance, see, e.g, David Nelken, Using the 
Concept of Legal Culture, 29 Australian J. Leg. Phil. 1 (2004).  It is possible that, in some respects, persons from the 
same family of legal culture might be regarded for some purposes as “insiders”, suggesting that perhaps the polar 
distinction we have worked with ought to be viewed as on a continuum or more complex map. Yet even persons 
from closely allied cultures but different countries could fairly be viewed as “outsiders” for purposes of concerns 
over issues of democratic control and accountability within a state.  
104 See note 154, infra. 
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geographically distant) representatives of a foreign state in a way that increases openness to their 
interventions in constitutional disputes; but equally, they may have a history of conflict with 
local actors that may increase resistance to such intervention.
105 
 
B.  How and When 
How outsiders approach the task of interpreting a foreign constitution will affect the   
likely accuracy of their interpretations and, in the case of outsider communications (typically 
from governments or IGOs) designed to influence the foreign state, may also affect the 
appropriateness, or utility, of publicly communicating those judgments about constitutional 
meaning.  
To begin with, the depth and clarity of the reasoning offered by outsiders in support of a 
conclusion about departures from or compliance with domestic constitutional law will bear on its 
likely deliberative contribution and may also affect its perceived impartiality. The burden of 
justification on outsiders may vary depending on what has occurred domestically.  If a domestic 
organ of government provides a reasoned justification for an interpretation under the domestic 
constitution, for example, outside interveners may then have the burden of meeting that 
reasoning with their own, especially if they are in disagreement with authorized internal 
interpreters.   
One need not be a thoroughgoing Erie-style positivist to think that generally, internal 
organs of a state will be better situated to say what their law means than are external organs. This 
may be so for several quite different reasons: On one version of the jurisprudential underpinnings 
of Erie, “law” can mean only that which its authorized expositors say it means. But apart from 
such an ultra-positivist view, the Erie approach may be justified on the quite different grounds 
that, generally, local interpreters will be better in touch with local sentiment and understanding, 
and thereby better able to give interpretations that keep law grounded in democratic sentiment.  
Alternatively, it might be argued that, like administrative agencies charged with the 
interpretation and enforcement of particular statutory schemes, national states have a 
presumptive degree of expertise in the interpretation of their own laws.  
Where, by contrast a domestic organ, including a court, offers no reasoning in support of 
a decision, or introduces ex post facto reasons to justify prior action not noted at the time, the 
relative burden on outsiders might be thought to be diminished.   Likewise, if domestic 
interpretive authority is both shared and in conflict, the burden of justification facing outsiders 
might also be thought to be somewhat diminished, compared to the situation in which insiders 
speak with a single voice.  Outside interpreters, however, also may be thought to have an 
                                                       
105 See e.g. the local resistance to the comments of U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, Robert Callahan, in 2009. See 
note 87, supra.  A separate question might be raised about interpretive advice that is given privately, by outsiders. 
Because we focus here only on instances of public interventions, we do not in this paper address questions about 
how to reconcile the arguable need for confidentiality in executive communications with the benefits of transparency 
in reasoning about constitutional interpretation. 
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obligation in such cases to at least recognize the different internal viewpoints and take account of 
them in whatever ultimate opinion they reach.    
The opportunity for domestic interpretation is likewise connected to the timing of when 
outsiders intervene in debates over domestic constitutional interpretation.   Delay in outsider 
interpretation, for example, will generally have two inter-related benefits:  First, it will allow 
more time for local interpretive debate, and thus avoid the possibility that outsider interpretive 
intervention will distort, or undermine the possibilities for, robust internal debate.
106 Second, it 
will also allow more time for careful study by outsiders.  
One of the striking features of the Honduran example, noted above, was how quick the 
international community and particular states within it were to reach conclusions about the 
domestic constitutional situation. 
107 Yet speedy responses to an apparent military coup are to be 
expected, as such events are rarely consistent with the rule of law and with the operation of 
democracy.  Thus, while time might be thought to allow more study and better reasoned 
conclusions on constitutional issues, those outside interpreters with the capacity for coercion 
may have sound reasons, arising from international commitments to democracy and to the 
avoidance of military interventions, to speak quickly.  And where a legal regime ties together 
international norms with domestic constitutional norms, outsider interpretation may be both 
inevitable and done on a very short time frame 
108  Such context-specific features, in other words, 
may justify foregoing the benefits of more time.
109 
                                                       
106 A potentially useful analogy, in the U.S. federal context, is the way in which the Supreme Court has applied a 
doctrine of “Pullman abstention” to federal constitutional challenges to state statutes or constitutions, see, e.g., Reetz 
v Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970) (concerning meaning of Alaska state constitution, which had not yet been subject to 
state court interpretation), a doctrine based, in part, on the relative expertise and competence of federal and state 
courts in respect of state laws. See RR Com’n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941) (Frankfurter J.) 
(suggesting that “as outsiders without special competence in [state] law, [they] would have little confidence in 
[their] independent judgment regarding the application of that law” absent guidance from state courts).   
107 Cf. U.S. Waffles on Honduras, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 22, 2009, C14 (noting that although President Obama 
was quick to protest Zelaya’s overthrow, the State Department took “more than two months to officially declare the 
action a coup d'etat, a legal determination that requires the suspension of all non-humanitarian aid”). Although State 
Department spokesperson Philip Crowley referred to the events of June 28, 2009, as a “coup d’etat” in announcing 
the termination of certain aid, see Paul Richter, U.S. Cuts Aid to Latin Nation, L.A. Times, Sept 4 2009, p. A 26, in 
fact it does not appear that the State Department had found that a “coup” had occurred but rather avoided such a 
finding. See Howard LaFranchi, WashingtonUups the Pressure on Honduras by Cutting Aid,  CHRISTINA SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Sept. 4 2009,; Irish Times, US cuts $30m aid to Honduras but Stays Silent on Military Coup, Sept 4 2009, 
p. 11. One may speculate that perhaps the complications of the Honduran situation contributed to the hesitancy to 
find a formal coup, though other more pragmatic, political may have played a role as well or instead.  
108 With respect to regimes that tie international obligations to domestic constitutional law, one of us has suggested 
that there may be normative benefits to some greater degree of separation from international rules, as such, and 
domestic constitutional rules, as such, to preserve a kind of critical distance between them from which each system 
can critique the other. See Jackson, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, supra note 78.  
109  Cf. City of Houston v Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467-68 (1987) (suggesting that Pullman abstention may not be 
appropriate where sensitive First Amendment rights would be chilled by the delay involved in awaiting state court 
resolution of the questions). 
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Especially in contexts in which events are moving quickly, as in Honduras, consistency 
across cases addressed by outsiders will be relevant to perceptions of impartiality. Such even-
handedness may, however, be especially difficult to find in executive branch interpretation, in 
which a variety of national interests may influence when a foreign constitutional dispute is even 
addressed; in international organizations, as well, there may be dominance by particularly 
powerful states that will influence the even-handedness with which criteria for interpretive 
interventions are applied. Even without evidence of such consistency, other factors – such as 
outsider interpretations that are seen as inconsistent with the national interests of the interpreter 
(narrowly understood), or the balance and persuasiveness of the analysis, or the institutional 
structures of independence and impartiality of the decisionmaker, or the reputation for 
impartiality of a particular person – may support perceptions of impartiality.  Organizations that 
have developed criteria which they apply publicly and across all similar cases may be able to 
offer higher degrees of impartiality in offering outsider assessments.  In these ways, the “how” of 
interpretation may also be linked to the entity or person offering it. 
 
C.   Why? Consent, Externalities, Necessity, Bad Faith, and Inadequate Opportunity for 
Internal Constitutional Debate: Analogies from Judicial Federalism and International Law   
 Factors of identity and coercion, of the when and how of outsider interpretation, do not 
address squarely the most central issue: why should outsiders, particularly officials in other 
states, ever have occasion to opine on, and base their government’s coercive stance on, 
interpretations of another states’ domestic constitutional law?  After all, as noted earlier, public 
law in general and constitutional law, in particular, is often thought to be closely linked to 
expressive features of a legal culture, or to particularly path dependent kinds of constitutional 
histories.
110  Although this may not be true everywhere, it is the case in a number of countries. 
Outsider interpretation, moreover, lacks the democratic legitimacy and connection on which 
internal contests and resolution of constitutional issues are founded; especially in countries with 
democratically created, ratified or consented to constitutions, and an ongoing democratic system, 
this would create a significant risk of resistance. Moreover, given the easy-to-anticipate 
possibility that outsider interventions may create domestic backlashes that do not advance 
commitment to constitutionalism and the rule of law, whether in democratic or not-so democratic 
countries, why should such risks ever be undertaken? 
                                                       
110 On expressivism, see Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 Yale L. J. 1225, 
1269-84  (1999); on the peculiar path dependency of public law and public institutions, see John Bell, Comparing 
Public Law, in Comparing Law in the 21
st Century (Andrew Harding & Esin Orucu eds. 2002).  Questions about 
outsider interventions may arise not only in the area of constitutional law but with respect to other forms of domestic 
law, and indeed, with respect to nonlegal “policy” based diplomatic or NGO or scholarly interventions. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to explore the degrees to which such questions overlap with, or are distinct from, those 
involved with outsider constitutional interpretation.  For now, we suggest only that the degree to which constitutions 
may be particularly bound up with understandings of national identity and/or are regarded as particularly 
foundational to a national legal system may give, in some cases, a heightened sensitivity as compared to other areas. 
See generally Vicki C. Jackson,  Methodological Challenges in Comparative Constitutional Law, 28 Penn St. Int'l L. 
Rev. 319 (2010).  
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There are a number of answers to this question; and in this part, we point to four 
emerging transnational public law norms – concerning consent, externalities, bad faith (legal 
irregularity) and the (in)adequacy of the local legal forum – that may be thought to provide 
potential justifications for particular instances of outsider interpretation.  In addition, we suggest 
that decision-makers may face a domestic legal necessity, or duty, to decide on some issue of 
foreign law, in the course of resolving their own domestic legal questions.  Whether readers 
agree or not with these suggestions, we think that asking the “why” question is itself important, 
especially if interpretation is linked to forms of coercion, that is, efforts to get a state to change 
its interpretation through pressures that go beyond the persuasive value of the arguments offered.   
Attention to the criteria we identify, therefore, should in no way obscure the need for ongoing 
attention by potential outsider interpreters to the specifics of a particular case. 
1. Consent: When it comes to concerns about democratic legitimacy in particular, consent 
may vitiate these objections to an important extent. Consent, for example, is generally the basis 
for the involvement of outsiders – as advisors –in the process of constitutional drafting.   Thus, 
when foreign “experts” are invited in to a constitution-drafting process by duly authorized 
lawmakers, as occurred recently in Kenya,
111 objections from democracy to their role in the 
process may be mitigated, even if not entirely dissolved.  A similar position also applies where 
foreign experts are invited by domestic actors to opine on compliance with domestic 
constitutional norms (as occurred recently in Honduras).
112  In such cases, entirely indigenous 
processes (democratic or otherwise) intervene to accept or reject work in which foreign experts 
participate.   
Consent is also the classic basis of “coercive interpretation” through enforcement of 
treaty norms by outsiders.   In Europe, for example, states that are parties to the European 
Convention on Human Rights have, since 1998, consented to the European Court of Human 
Rights hearing “applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the 
rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto”,
113 regardless of whether the source of 
the violation is a domestic statute, common law norm, policy or constitutional requirement. 
114  
Within the Commonwealth, there is a tradition of constitutional interpretation by outsiders (i.e. 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (PC)) based on forms of consent.
115   And in some 
                                                       
111 See e.g. Alicia L. Bannon, Note: Designing a Constitution Drafting Process: Lessons from Kenya, 116 Yale L. J. 
1824 (2007); Constitution Of Kenya Review Bill, 2008, Part II (establishing a Committee of Experts to draft a new 
constitution).  
112 In this case, the Honduran Truth and Reconciliation Commission asked Professor Noah Feldman, of the Harvard 
Law School, along with two other U.S. law professors and one Honduran attorney, to examine the constitutionality 
of the actions that occurred there in 2009. See Feldman Report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra 
note 67, terms of reference. 
113 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S. 155, 
entered into force 1 November 1998,  Art 34,  http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/euro/z30prot11.html 
114 On the application of these European human rights rules to national constitutions, see, e.g., Sejdić and Finci v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 8. 
115 Historically, the Privy Council heard appeals from all British colonies without any form of local consent, but 
upon obtaining independence, these former colonies were given at least the formal choice of abolishing such 
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former Commonwealth countries that have created hybrid courts, there is an authorized basis in 
domestic law for the participation of outsider judges, although typically on multi-member 
benches there are local judges involved as well.
116   
In the Americas, members of the OAS have likewise at least arguably consented to a 
form of extra-territorial constitutional interpretation by the General Assembly of the OAS. 
Article 19 of the Interamerican Democratic Charter of 2001 states: 
Based on the principles of the Charter of the OAS and subject to its norms, and in 
accordance with the democracy clause contained in the Declaration of Quebec City, an 
unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of 
the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state, 
constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable obstacle to its government’s participation 
in sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the Councils of the 
Organization, the specialized conferences, the commissions, working groups, and other 
bodies of the Organization.
  
Article 21 authorizes the suspension from membership of a state found to have an 
“unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order”, by a two-thirds vote of the membership, 
from participation in the OAS General Assembly.  These provisions were adopted by the OAS 
member states at a special session of the General Assembly on September 11, 2001.  Thus, the 
Charter itself also created a significant possible justification for the General Assembly of the 
OAS to opine on the constitutionality of President Zelaya’s removal in Honduras in 2009, if a 
less certain basis for decisions by individual members of the General Assembly (such as the 
U.S.) to express a separate view of this question. This appears to be part of a growing trend of  
international agreements arguably consenting to outsider evaluation of  domestic constitutional 
compliance. 
117  
                                                                                                                                                                               
appeals.   Both Ireland and India, for example, abolished all appeals to the PC upon gaining independence in 1933 
and 1949: see e.g. Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act 1949 (India); Constitution (Amendment No. 22) Act, 
1933.    Many countries, of course, were subject to pressure from the UK to retain such appeals, thus creating 
varying degrees of actual consent in this context. See further, notes 127-130, infra. 
116 See, e.g., Mason, supra note 64; Dale, supra note 64. 
117 See generally Lech Garlicki & Zofia A. Garlicka, External Review of Constitutional Amendments? International 
Law as a Norm of Reference, 44 Isr. L. Rev. 343 (2011).   Interestingly, in some treaty language agreed to by the 
United States there is an arguable basis, in consent, for interpretation of the U.S. constitution by outsiders.  The U.S. 
Senate’s reservations to the ICCPR state that it does “not authorize or require” anything that “would restrict the right 
of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States”. Unlike some other treaty 
reservations, this reservation does not contain language that specifies that the reference to the Constitution is to the 
Constitution “as interpreted by the United States”.  For discussion of this treaty language as an implied consent for 
forms of outsider interpretation, see, e.g., Paust, Van Dyke, Malone, International Law and Litigation in the U.S. 
329 (3d ed. 2009).  In the Commonwealth, member states have agreed, via the Commonwealth Heads of 
Governments meeting, to give authority to the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group to "respond to", and thus 
also identify, "instances where there is an unconstitutional overthrow of an elected government".(see e.g. 
"Commonwealth Leaders Agree to Strengthen Ministerial Action Group", October 28, 2011,  available 
athttp://www.thecommonwealth.org/press/31555/34582/242191/281011cmag.htm).  In Africa, Article 4 of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union also provides that one of the founding principles of the Union is that it is 
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Likewise, in the context of U.S. federalism doctrines, consent will often permit actions 
otherwise deemed prohibited by constitutional federalism principles.  Thus, for example, suits 
against states in federal courts are prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment, except when a state 
consents.
118 States may not discriminate against goods from other states except when the national 
Congress, acting on behalf of all of the states, so provides or consents.
119 Actions that the 
national Congress may not compel the states to undertake may become state obligations if the 
states agree to undertake them (often as a condition for receiving federal funds).
120 And a federal 
constitutional challenge to state laws may go forward where a state consents, where a federal 
court would otherwise generally be required to abstain from hearing such a challenge until the 
conclusion of relevant state court proceedings.
121 
The idea of consent, however, is also a complex one, which cannot simply be accepted 
across all contexts at face value.   Consent to outsider interpretation, for example, may be given 
at a single moment in time, or may be more ongoing. To the extent that withdrawal or exit from a 
treaty regime is practically available, moreover, one could say that consent continues. But as 
with older constitutions, the connection between these legalized forms of consent and ongoing 
democratic agreement to participation may become more attenuated over time.   
Complex questions may also arise as to whom – e.g., chief executive and/or parliament, 
or what kind of democratic majority, elected in what circumstances –may legitimately act for a 
state, whether in consenting, or revoking consent to outsider interpretation.  Consider the history 
of attempts to abolish appeals to the PC in Jamaica and the former Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).    
In Jamaica, in 2004, the government purported to pass legislation removing appeals to the PC, 
but the PC held that the Jamaican parliament could not in fact do this, and confer appellate 
jurisdiction on the CCJ, without obtaining super, rather than simple, majority support in the 
Jamaican parliament.
122    In Rhodesia, in 1965, there was a clearer democratic deficit in the 
decision by the Smith government to abolish appeals to the PC, as part of unilateral declaration 
                                                                                                                                                                               
committed to the “condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments”.  For discussion, see 
ALISON DUXBURY, THE PARTICIPATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS: THE ROLE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY  [___](2011). 
118 See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (noting the common law rule, entrenched by the 11
th Amendment, 
that a state may not be sued without its consent); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44  (1996) 
(Rehnquist CJ.) (affirming the idea that “federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States ‘was not 
contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States’”) (citing Hans, at 15). 
119 See, e.g., Hillside Dairy Inc v Lyons 539 U.S. 59 (2003) (endorsing such a principle, though requiring a clear 
statement of Congressional intent for it to take effect). 
  
120 See e.g. South Dakota v. Dole 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
121 For the general requirement of abstention in such a case, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). For the 
relevant exception, see Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977). 
122 Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights (1998) Ltd & Ors v. Marshall-Burnett & Anor (Jamaica) [2005] 
UKPC 3 (holding that by conferring appellate jurisdiction on a court whose judges had a different form of 
independence and security of tenure, from the members of the PC, the Jamaican parliament was effectively 
amending the provisions of the Jamaican constitution in a way that required legislation to meet these more 
demanding requirements). 
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of independence:  the government making this declaration was an all-white government reacting 
to pressure from the UK to recognize a principle of black majority rule.
123  Thus, by rejecting the 
effectiveness of the UDI, and the associated attempt to abolish appeals to the PC, the PC was 
arguably advancing, rather than undermining, any meaningful principle of democracy.
124  
Consent may, even at the outset, also be more formal than real, or the result of varying 
degrees of pressure from outsiders.   In Europe, for example, accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights is a clear precondition to membership to the European Union, so 
that many states clearly feel strong economic pressure to consent to the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights, including in respect of constitutional matters.
125   In the 
Commonwealth, there has also historically been clear diplomatic pressure, from the UK, for 
former colonies to retain appeals to the PC (though this now appears to be changing
126).   In 
Australia, for example, at the time of the drafting of the 1901 Commonwealth Constitution, the 
Australian founders initially sought to remove appeals to the PC in constitutional matters, but 
Joseph Chamberlain, the then Colonial Secretary, protested.
127 Eventually, a compromise was 
reached whereby appeals to the PC were retained in all matters, but in matters involving state 
and federal relations, an Australian court was first required to issue a certificate before such an 
appeal could be brought.
128 (PC jurisdiction continued until 1975 and 1986 in appeals from the 
High Court and state courts, respectively.
129)  Similarly, in the case of Ireland, the Attorney-
General for England and Wales is reported to have told the Irish Attorney-General that Ireland 
had no right to abolish such appeals upon gaining independence, but the PC itself upheld this 
right in a 1935 decision.
130 
                                                       
123 Tayyab Mahmud, Jurisprudence of Successful Treason: Coup d’Etat & Common Law, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
49, 60–61 (1994).  
124 See e.g., Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1969] 1 AC 645.   In this case, of course, the prior ‘consent’ was 
more nominal rather than real, and not the product, as in some other Commonwealth countries, of actual substantive 
consent upon independence.  The example illustrates the dangers of accepting the legitimacy any and all attempts to 
revoke consent, regardless of the fairness of the procedures followed in doing so.   
125 On EU accession pressures, see e.g. Robert J. Goebel, Joining the European Union: The Accession Procedure for 
Central European and Mediterranean States, 1 LOYAL UNI CHICAGO INT’L L. REV. 15, 28 (2003).  
126 See e.g., “Privy Council’s Caribbean Complaint”, BBCCaribbean.com, Tuesday, 22 September 2009, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2009/09/090922_privyccjphillips.shtml (noting comments by the 
President of the Supreme Court of the UK, Lord Phillips, that “’in an ideal world' Commonwealth countries — 
including those in the Caribbean — would stop using the Privy Council and set up their own final courts of appeal 
instead”). 
127 See Andrew Dilley, Empire and Risk: Edwardian Financiers, Australia and Canada, c. 1899-1914 (Paper 
presented at Conference on Business History, 2009), at 5-6. 
128 See Commonwealth Constitution 1901, s. 74. For further discussion see Dilley, supra note 127, at 6.  
129 See Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975, Australia Acts 1986 (Cth); Australia Acts 1986 
(UK). 
130 See Moore v. Attorney-General of the Irish Free State, [1935] 1 I.R. 472. 
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Various forms of more delegated consent, in particular, may also have a more attenuated 
connection to the democratic decision-making that provides normative weight to consent as a 
legal value.
131   Consider, for example, the consent involved in the acceptance of the 
Intermaerican Democratic Charter, under which the OAS had a basis for opinion in the Honduras 
case. As already noted, the Interamerican Democratic Charter of 2001 authorized the suspension 
from participation in the General Assembly of a state found to have an “unconstitutional 
interruption of the democratic order,” by a vote of the OAS membership.  These provisions were 
adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS; but the Interamerican Democratic Charter is not 
itself an international agreement.
132  Consent to the Interamerican Democratic Charter, and thus 
to suspension under that Charter, is derived from member state agreement to the OAS Charter 
(which authorized the General Assembly to make policy, generally by majority vote) and then 
from the more explicit actions of the governments of member states in approving the Charter, 
which authorized the General Assembly to take further action.  This is clearly a form of consent, 
and pursuant to legally authorized procedures; but it is arguably a more diluted form than can be 
found in the original terms of a treaty, especially one that must be and has been ratified by a 
domestic legislature, or than the kind of consent (in a constitution or piece of domestic 
legislation) to including foreign judges on national courts.  The more specific consent to outsider 
constitutional interpretation, given by the Inter-American Democratic Charter, appears to have 
resulted only from the actions of executive officials of member states and not the member states’ 
legislative bodies. 
Thus, consent matters significantly to the legitimacy of outsider interpretation; but it may 
exist in different forms, and have different strengths in particular contexts and may not always be 
a sufficient basis for all forms of outsider interpretation.  
2. Externalities and Interests/Duties and Internal Necessity: The interests, or duties, of 
outsiders are other factors that will affect the appropriateness of outsider forms of constitutional 
interpretation.   In some cases, outsiders may have a legal duty, under domestic law, to make 
decisions that require consideration of foreign constitutional norms.   Courts, for example, may 
be required to address questions of domestic constitutional law that turn directly on the content 
of foreign constitutional norms.  Courts whose constitutions direct them to consider the meaning 
of international texts may feel impelled to consider how other courts have interpreted them in the 
context of their own constitutional systems, and, if there is disagreement, to make choices.  This 
is a form of interpretation not intended as coercive, but which may be experienced as an 
interference by other countries.  
                                                       
131 The relationship between international delegations of authority and domestic “sovereignty” or democratic control 
of decisions has been explored in a growing literature. For a helpful introduction, see Oona Hathaway, The Law And 
Politics Of International Delegation: International Delegation And State Sovereignty, 71 Law & Contemp. Prob. 
115 (2008). 
132 See, e.g., Timothy D. Rudy, A Quick Look at the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the OAS: What is it and 
is it ‘Legal’?, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 237, 241-242 (2005-2006).  The Inter-American Juridical Committee 
of the OAS opined, just before its enactment, that the suspension provisions of the Inter-American Charter may have 
gone beyond the bounds of interpretation of the OAS Charter. See Annual Report of the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee (Aug 24, 2001), at 32-33.  However, the preamble to the Charter expresses the view of the members, 
unanimously, that the Inter-American Charter represents a clarification of the meaning of the OAS Charter.  
http://law.bepress.com/unswwps-flrps12/53 
 
37
There may be more specific questions in particular areas, such as whether another 
country’s system for providing compensation for takings meets international standards, under 
which an understanding of what that country’s own laws, including its constitution, provide may 
be relevant. Issues may arise where extradition or other forms of removal to a foreign state are 
sought, or deportation is at issue, concerning the treatment to be expected in another state; again, 
it is at least in theory possible that an understanding of foreign constitutions may be relevant to 
those inquiries, even if they are more likely to be focused on practices on the ground.
133  And 
under international human rights law, which may be determined by a supra national or 
international tribunal, there are questions about whether an interference with a right protected 
under international law is “in accordance with law.”
134  
Executive branch officials, moreover, in order to make judgments about their own 
dealings with foreign governments, may also be obligated by their own laws to consider the 
constitutional requirements in another country or the constitutional authority of their officials to 
enter into a binding agreement.   In interpreting various statutory requirements, such as the U.S. 
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, for example, executive officials may also be required to 
decide the constitutional status of foreign actors’ claim to recognition.
135 
In other cases, constitutional outcomes in another country may affect the legitimate 
interests of other states in maintaining their own security, or environmental quality, or economic 
stability, and therefore involve clear forms of constitutional “externality”.  These externalities 
may, for example, be financial: if U.S. companies have investments in a foreign state, there may 
be a perceived national interest in protecting the economic value of those companies interpreting 
the foreign state’s constitution and laws in a way consistent with international obligations of 
compensation in the event of a taking.  Externalities may also be tied to a country’s diplomatic or 
international legal obligations: if citizens of one state are being held and tried in another, for 
example, the state of the defendant’s citizenship may have a strong diplomatic interest in how the 
foreign state’s constitution and laws are interpreted, so as to protect the national.
136   If a foreign 
state fails to comply with its own basic constitutional rights standards this may also impose 
obligations on other states under international law (under either the Refugees Convention or 
Convention Against Torture.
137 for example) that creates a direct interest, on the part of those 
                                                       
133 Compare Soering, supra note 17; and M70, supra note 18. 
134 See, e.g., ICCPR art. 6(2) (“In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be 
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the 
crime…”); art. 9 (1) (“No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law. “) 
135 See supra note 34 (referring to the U.S. State Department’s explanation of suspension of aid to Fiji in 2006).  
136  Compare e.g. Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) (finding a 
constitutional duty on the part of the state to protect nationals from the danger of violations of certain fair trial 
rights/rights to freedom and security of the person under relevant foreign legal norms).  
137 See Convention relating to the Statues of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-
20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
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other states, in ensuring that constitutional norms are interpreted so as to guarantee such 
standards. 
Likewise, as suggested earlier, states with a deep commitment to international law as a 
binding set of rules may have an interest in the interpretation of an influential constitution, like 
that of the United States, where the constitutional norms appear to overlap with international 
norms; as we discussed above, this account may explain why the EU filed amici briefs in U.S. 
death penalty cases, or why Commonwealth lawyers and those from Israel filed amicus briefs on 
questions of what judicial process was due to U.S held detainees on Guantanamo.
138  
Such externalities might be understood as always present when, in a single federal 
system, a subnational unit is interpreting the national constitution.  What each subunit’s courts 
say about the meaning of the national constitution (or even about the meaning of comparable 
language in subnational unit constitutions) could inform and possibly affect how other members 
of the federation interpret such language.   Within a single federation there may well be an 
interest in uniformity of the interpretation of the common national constitution; such an interest 
in uniformity of interpretation is always affected by decisions of the subparts with respect to that 
national constitution.
139    
The same cannot be said to be true in the international community, or at least not to the 
same degree.  There is no “world constitution;” the Charter of the United Nations is not intended 
to create a system of world governance and has very few provisions concerning the internal 
domestic organization of its member states; it embodies as well a principle of member state 
sovereignty and equality.   Nonetheless, recent efforts to allocate jurisdictional authority as 
between local, national or supranational levels of governance have increasingly placed weight on 
the idea of externalities – that is, the idea that if an action affects persons outside the jurisdiction, 
that counts as a reason to enable decisionmaking at a level of governance that includes those 
affected; the European doctrine of subsidiarity might be understood as in part about the 
relationship of externalities to jurisdiction.
140   The increasing areas of overlap between 
                                                       
138 States with distinctive constitutional positions may also, at least in theory, have interests in trying to prevent the 
development of either customary international law norms, or “generic” constitutional norms, see generally David 
Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652 (2005), that might later be invoked to try to force change in 
the non-conforming states.  See also John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 309 
(2006). This theoretical possibility may be based on an assumption of greater possibilities for constitutional 
convergence than are likely to exist.  See, e.g.,  Rosalind Dixon & Eric Posner, The Limits of Constitutional 
Convergence, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 399 (2011). 
139 Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), which might be understood as a doctrinal effort to limit 
externalities that arise from state court interpretation of state constitutional provisions whose language is similar to 
that in the national constitution. 
140  See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Federal Powers and the Principle of Subsidiarity in Global Perspectives on 
Constitutional Law (V. Amar and M. Tushnet, eds., 2009)(exploring idea of subsidiarity as either requiring 
delegation up to higher level of governance or down to lower level depending, inter alia, on effects of contemplated 
area of action); Mattias Kumm, Democratic Constitutionalism Encounters International Law: Terms of 
Engagement, in The Migration of Constitutional ideas (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006); Mattias Kumm, The 
Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State in 
RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey Dunoff and 
Joel Trachtman eds. 2009). 
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international law and the subjects of domestic constitutional law may also imply a growing arena 
in which some degree of externality is imposed by acts of domestic constitutional interpretation, 
which may warrant some response, by way of outsider interpretation.  
3. Bad Faith or Legal Irregularity as Undermining Deference to Local Interpreters: As 
noted above, interpreting a domestic constitution in a world community of states differs from the 
situation in some federal nations, the U.S. among them, where subnational states are interpreting 
the same national constitution that binds others.  In some federal states, including the United 
States, however, the subnational states have their own, state-level constitutions and laws.  
Ordinarily, in the United States, under the rules developed by Erie RR v. Tompkins,
141 the state 
courts are viewed as the “final” interpreters of the meaning of their own state laws.  However, 
some exceptions to this commitment do exist, perhaps most famously illustrated in recent years 
in Bush v. Gore.
142  There, three justices of the U.S. Supreme Court were prepared to hold that 
the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law – as authorizing a manual ballot recount 
under the circumstances before it – was incorrect;  the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the state's election laws was unconstitutional, these three justices thought,  under the U.S. 
Constitution, Article II, Section 1, clause 2 (which says that the state legislatures should provide 
for the manner in which presidential electors are chosen) because the state court’s interpretation  
“distorted” those state laws “beyond what a fair reading required.”
143 
In so arguing, the three justices drew on a small but not insignificant line of cases in 
which the Supreme Court had found certain grounds of state law to be “inadequate” to foreclose 
federal review of the federal questions presented.  (The Court has appellate jurisdiction over 
cases in the state courts only with respect to federal questions.)  Ordinarily, if a state court 
holding rests on independent and alternative grounds, one of which is based on state law and the 
other on federal law, the Supreme Court cannot review the federal holding.
144  Likewise, where a 
state court judgment rejecting a federal constitutional claim rests on an independent and adequate 
ground of state procedural law –for example, that the issue was not properly or timely raised –
further Supreme Court review of that federal issue is precluded.  However, where state courts 
have relied on grounds that appear bizarre, or novel, or invoked in bad faith, to preclude review 
of claimed violations of the federal constitution, the Supreme Court will ignore the state ground - 
-treat it as “inadequate” to foreclose review of the federal issue.
145  
                                                       
141 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
142 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
143 531 U.S. 98, 113-15 (2000) (Rehnquist C.J., concurring). 
144  Fox Film Corp v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 209-10 (1935). One of the principal rationales for this doctrine is that, if 
the judgment rests on an “independent and adequate state ground,” the Court’s judgment on the federal issue would 
be merely advisory, it could not make a difference to the outcome of the case, and is thus prohibited by “case or 
controversy” limitations of the Article III courts. 
145  See, e.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 
(1958); Lee v Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002). We recognize, of course, considerable differences between regimes of 
single federated states, under a single national constitution, recognized by all parties as supreme, on the one hand, 
and the interventions into domestic constitutional interpretation made by outsiders who are not bound by the 
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Similarly, when national interpretive bodies engage in bizarre or novel explanations of 
domestic constitutional norms, or appear to show bad faith in the process of constitutional 
reasoning, it can perhaps be said that the deference typically owed to local decisionmakers will 
be undermined.  This will also be especially true where, in adopting such an interpretation, they 
also depart from more general norms of democratic constitutionalism.
146 
Consistent with this, in Nicaragua, in 2009, for example, critics of the decision by the CJI 
to invalidate constitutional term limits, on the Presidency, placed strong emphasis on procedural 
irregularities in the process by which the relevant panel of the Court was constituted (or the fact 
that the bench that decided the case was composed entirely of Sandinista-appointed judges).
147  
The EU Parliament, for example, expressly noted that the relevant Court panel “met during the 
night, in the absence of three of the six member judges, who were not invited and who were 
replaced by three pro- government judges”.
148 The U.S. Ambassador likewise emphasized the 
degree to which the Court’s processes were “unusual and rushed”.
149  Both sets of outside 
interpreters  ultimately rejected the validity of the domestic court’s decision, as a correct or 
controlling interpretation of the Nicaraguan constitution. 
Similarly, in the context of the constitutional crisis in Honduras, the Feldman report took 
express note of deviations from what it described as conventional practice as it analyzed whether 
the Honduran Congress had constitutional authority to remove the president.  For example, it 
noted that although the Congress arguably has interpretive power concerning the Constitution, in 
the past when it exercised that power it did so with an explicit statement to that effect.
150  It also 
noted that it was only some days after the Congress had voted to remove Zelaya, invoking 
several constitutional provisions, that the Congress asserted as an additional ground Article 239 
(dealing with the disqualification of persons who advocate for change in the single term 
presidency to stay in office).
151 These irregularities in procedure contributed to the Feldman 
report’s conclusion that the Congress had probably acted without authority. 
4.   Adequacy of Local Forum and Restrictions on Debate: Finally, we suggest, outsider 
constitutional interpretation may be more justified when there is not a well-functioning internal 
system for debate and contest about constitutional questions, and especially where there is 
suppression of free debate about constitutional questions.    
                                                                                                                                                                               
instrument they are interpreting. The “inadequate state ground” doctrine can be invoked without holding the state’s 
procedure independently to have violated the Constitution. 
146 Whether there are transnational norms of democratic constitutionalism, and if so, what they are, can be contested, 
as can the question whether they exist as rules, principles or values. See, e.g., JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENGAGEMENT, supra note 49. Compare also Rosalind Dixon, Transnational Anchoring (Working Paper, Presented 
at Conference in Honor of Vicki Jackson, Georgetown Law Center, November 2010). 
147 See e.g. the account of the process provided by Chief Justice Martinez: see Witte-Lebhar, supra note 47. 
148 EU Parliament Resolution, supra note 45, at para D. 
 
149 See Witte-Lebhar, supra note 47.  
150 Feldman Report to the Truth and Reconcilation Commission, supra note 67, at 59. 
151  Id. at 19. 
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It is important to recognize that interpretive questions in constitutional law may not 
always have a single right answer; there may be more than one way reasonably to understand the 
application of a constitutional provision to a particular setting.
152  Reasoned debate, within 
accepted discourses norms in the legal community, is relied on both to reach the better 
interpretation and to procedurally validate the choice that is made as the authoritative choice for 
the polity.
153  The possibility of reasoned debate also allows for a system to correct its own 
errors.  Where a constitutional question arises in an authoritarian or autocratic system in which 
there is not reliable freedom of debate on political questions, the question whether the rule of law 
is being followed can become more difficult to determine – the correctness vel non of an 
interpretation may be more difficult to discern because opposition is silenced; and the quality of 
contest preceding adoption of an interpretation affects our willingness to assume its correctness.  
In such cases, outsider interpretation may be able to provide a partial substitute for insider 
debate.
154  
That there may be a relationship between an inadequate opportunity for decisionmaking 
in an internal forum, and the propriety of external interventions, finds support in a number of 
other public law settings.  This idea can be seen in the Rome Statute’s provisions on 
“complementarity”, under which the International Criminal Court cannot take jurisdiction over a 
matter if there are local prosecutorial authorities willing and able genuinely to carry out an 
investigation and prosecution;
155 it may also be seen in the various statutory and judge-made 
U.S. “abstention” doctrines which forbid the exercise of federal court jurisdiction if  “a plain, 
                                                       
152  Moreover, countervailing considerations may caution against outsider interventions, even in polities that have 
suppressed free debate.  Such considerations may include not only limitations of competence, and risks of backlash 
noted already, but the possible threat to the rule of law if, for example, there were a very longstanding but highly 
contestable interpretation of a constitutional provision.  Some settled legal rules in unjust states, however, may be 
worth unsettling as part of a democratic transition, which adds to the difficulty in going beyond an identification of 
possibly relevant factors at this stage of analysis.     
153  For both epistemic and more ontological arguments for insisting on widespread participation in debate of public 
issues, see e.g., Jürgen Habermas, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VOLUME 1: REASON AND THE 
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1985); Adrian Vermeule, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF 
REASON (2008). 
154 This might suggest that – in addition to asking who is speaking, and by what means, how, when, and why – one 
should ask “to whom”  outsider interpretation is addressed, that is, which country,  or who within the country: 
compare note 104, supra.    Recent studies, for example, of the effects of treaty ratification have made significant 
progress in identifying what kinds of countries are most likely to see improvements in human rights following 
ratification of human rights treaties. See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009). However, in the context of the question we are addressing, which spans both 
consented to and nonconsensual interpretive interventions by a wide range of potential outside commenters, we 
believe it is more useful to focus on questions such as whether a country has vigorous channels of internal debate 
open on the issue, and on the relationships between the outsiders and the particular country involved.  
155 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, Art. 17(1)(A).  See 
also, Vicki C. Jackson, “To Endure for Ages to Come”: The U.S. Constitution in a Transnational Era, U. 
CINCINNATI L. REV. (forthcoming, 2012) (presented as the Taft Lecture, January 2011) (suggesting that growing 
norm of complementarity, reflecting abhorrence of “lawless” enclaves, provides some reason for national courts to 
explain decisions affecting what are widely regarded as human rights in terms understandable and respected by other 
countries). 
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speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such state”, 
156 or if a state court 
enforcement proceeding is already pending in which a federal constitutional challenge can be 
raised.
157   
 
Admittedly, the idea that a rich internal debate may diminish the need or reasons for 
outsider interpretation is in some potential tension with an idea expressed earlier, that allowing 
time for local decisionmakers to reflect is a good thing, all other things being equal, and thus that 
extraterritorial contributions should perhaps allow time for local development of the issue.  But 
where there is no real local development of the issue because debate is not allowed, the potential 
benefits of external interpretation may appear greater (relative to the potential risks), assuming 
that there are communities within the state that can listen and think, even if they cannot speak out 
without fear of punishment.  
 
One example of this, among recent instances of outsider interpretation, is the intervention 
by outsiders, after November 2007, in constitutional debates in Pakistan over the removal of 
various Supreme Court judges.   Prior to this, for example, when the Chief Justice of Pakistan, 
Iftikhar Chaudhry, was first removed in March 2007, the Supreme Court itself provided an 
important forum in which to test arguments about the constitutionality of his removal. While 
none of the judges on the Court were likely to be fully impartial, given their personal connection 
to the Chief Justice, the Court’s institutional independence at the time also remained quite strong.  
The response of the Prime Minister to the Court’s ruling, for example, was that Pakistanis ought 
to “accept the verdict with grace and dignity reflective of a mature nation.”
158  The fact that the 
Court ultimately divided on the issue of constitutionality was also further evidence of this 
(relative) independence.
159  The existence of these various majority and dissenting opinions also 
itself provided important depth to local interpretive debates over the question in Pakistan.  
 
The “lawyer’s movement”, which mobilized lawyers and judges to protest against the 
removal of Chief Justice Chaudhry, was also an important source of breadth in this constitutional 
interpretive debate.
160  As locally-trained lawyers, members of this movement were well-placed 
to evaluate the arguments that, in removing the Chief Justice, the President did not in fact 
comply with the requirements of Art 209 of the Constitution.
161 Further, by engaging in mass 
action, members of this movement were also able to make their arguments heard on broad scale, 
even in the face of strong counter-arguments by the President.
162  
 
                                                       
156 Johnson Act, 29 U.S.C. 1342 (dealing with public utility rates) 
157 Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 40-41 (1971). 
158 See Somini Sengupta, “Musharraf Loses Fight Over Suspension of Judge”, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2007.  
159 See “Pakistan’s Top Judge Reinstated”, BBC News, July 20, 2007. 
160 See, e.g., Ali Khan, “A Lawyer’s Mutiny in Pakistan”, Jurist, May 17, 2007.   
161 See, e.g., Sengupta, supra note 147. 
162 Id. 
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After November 2007, however, the Supreme Court of Pakistan was no longer anything 
like independent from the executive, and thus, was less able to contribute to an impartial internal 
dialogue about the constitutional status of the PCO, or the orders made under it to dismiss 
various judges.  Attempts by civil society to protest against the PCO, and the dismissal of judges, 
were also increasingly met with direct attempts at suppression by President Musharraf.   The 
president of the Pakistani Supreme Court Bar Association, Aitzaz Ahsan, for example, continued 
after November 2007 to make repeated calls for the restoration of the pre-emergency judiciary, 
but was subsequently detained by President Musharraf as part of a broader crack-down against 
the lawyer’s movement.
163 
 
In moving to suspend Pakistan for constitutional violations after November 2007, 
therefore, the Commonwealth was thus filling an increasing gap in free and open local 
constitutional debate.  The same also applies to the position of individual members of the U.S. 
Congress, and non-government actors (such as Harvard Law School) who, after November 2007, 
expressed support for the Chief Justice or members of the lawyer’s movement such as Ahsan.
164 
 
VI. Conclusion   
Outsider intervention in domestic constitutional disputes is far from new, but it has 
increased in recent years. The first aim of the article is simply to call attention to and identify 
various aspects of this phenomenon, as a distinctive feature of the complexly porous interpretive 
relationships of national and international actors around constitutional and international law in 
the evolving transnational setting in which multiple constitutional orders now operate. 
The article also considers the potential advantages, and disadvantages, of such outsider 
interpretation, and identifies some factors that may be relevant to evaluating the legitimacy, or 
desirability, of particular instances of constitutional interpretation by outsiders.  Three basic 
arguments for such interpretation are that it may be able to deepen and enrich processes of 
constitutional deliberation by insiders, to inform insiders about how different constitutional 
interpretive choices will affect or be viewed by external audiences, and to offer a more impartial 
perspective than insiders can in particularly sensitive, contested constitutional controversies.   
The downsides or risks of such interpretation, by contrast, are that it may be insufficiently 
informed or attentive to local contextual factors, create backlash against otherwise compelling 
constitutional arguments by insiders, or be in tension with existing constitutional interpretive 
norms, such as coherence, or commitments to “democratic” control of constitutional meaning. 
How these various advantages and disadvantages should be evaluated will depend almost 
entirely on the particular constitutional context. In analyzing these various contexts, the article 
suggests that at least five questions are worth considering:  who, by what means, how, when and 
why acts of outsider constitutional interpretation are contemplated or occurring.    
                                                       
163 See CRS Report for Congress, supra note 25, at 5 
164 See, e.g., “Pakistan’s Ousted Chief Justice Accepts HLS Medal of Freedom”, News, Harvard Law School, 
November 23, 2008. 
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Domestic courts and international NGO’s, we have suggested, may be well placed to 
offer relatively impartial, helpful, and non-coercive, forms of outsider interpretation of foreign 
constitutions.   Courts in particular are generally expected to act in a considered, deliberative 
way, which avoids the danger of overly hurried or poorly reasoned conclusions about foreign 
constitutional meaning; moreover, courts’ discussion of foreign constitutional law will generally 
not be aimed, at least directly, at forcing a change in other states’ conduct. Executive officials, by 
contrast, generally start from a quite different position as outside interpreters: they often lack any 
claim to or tradition of impartiality, yet have a clear capacity to exert coercive influence in the 
process of offering outside interpretations. For such officials, the mode, timing, and reasons for 
engaging in such interpretation will therefore be extremely important.  
  Answering these questions can also be guided, the article suggests, by decision-makers 
turning both inward and outward.  In the U.S. federal system, doctrines of “abstention” provide 
importance guidance to federal courts in deciding when to intervene in state court proceedings; 
such doctrines, although developed in the distinctive context of a single federal system under a 
single national constitution, may nonetheless suggest factors to consider before other national 
decision-makers decide whether or when to engage in acts of “outsider” interpretation.  Notions 
of consent, the adequacy of the local forum, the good faith and/or the “novel and bizarre” 
application of state law are also factors that have helped inform U.S. federal courts in the 
exercise of their jurisdiction. Such factors may also bear on the justifications for (or the why 
question behind) particular instances of outsider constitutional interpretation. 
Regional and international legal systems are also increasingly developing norms that may 
offer useful guidance for national decision-makers, in evaluating this key question, of why 
intervene in particular domestic constitutional controversies. Consent, for example, remains a 
very significant aspect of international legal regimes (although there have been some inroads on 
this principle, especially in the development of the idea of jus cogens).  Efforts to assess the 
distribution of jurisdictional authority as between national and supranational levels of 
governance have also increasingly placed weight on the idea of externalities – that is, the idea 
that if an action affects persons outside the jurisdiction, that counts as a reason to enable 
decisionmaking at a level of governance that includes those affected, as well as on the adequacy 
of national (or local) fora or mechanisms for decision-making.  This idea can be seen, for 
example, in European notions of subsidiarity; and international criminal law principles of 
complementarity likewise focus on the adequacy of national institutions of criminal justice. Such 
factors, we suggest, may also bear on the interpretive interventions that have been the focus of 
this  paper.      
What we have called “outsider” or “extraterritorial” interpretation, in which an official or 
tribunal of one country expresses an interpretive view about constitutional events in another 
country, is a phenomenon that is in some sense driven by the increasing interaction among 
different constitutional systems and between national and transnational legal norms.   Given 
increased interactions among peoples and states, across a very wide range of activities 
implicating national and international law, the opportunities for constitutional interpretation by 
outsiders are only likely to increase.  As we have suggested, the coercive nature of some forms 
of outsider interpretation may be thought to call for especial caution, as such coercively 
motivated interpretive interventions bear risks and dangers that differ from those posed by the 
consideration of foreign law for purposes of better understanding the interpreters’ own law. It 
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can be expected, however, that the interactive pressures of globalization will produce a 
multidirectional set of influences on and among national and international sources of public law 
that will reveal not only areas of contest and divergence but also areas of overlap, or 
convergence, between various norms of domestic and international public law that bear on 
questions of interpretive authority and pluralism.  To the extent that overlapping normative 
principles emerge from these processes, we have suggested, they may also provide useful 
sources of guidance, for outsiders, in deciding whether, when and why to make interpretive 
interventions in domestic constitutional disputes. 
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